Europe’s political crisis may bring new leaders, but Russia has little reason to assume they will choose peace over confrontation
For Russia, developments in the rest of Europe matter primarily insofar as they affect our national interests. Above all, this concerns security given that, for centuries, Russia has faced its greatest challenges from the West, and there’s little reason to assume that this historical pattern has disappeared.
Western Europe’s leading countries now stand at a crossroads, yet the choice confronting them isn’t simply between competing models of domestic development, it’s between war and peace with their neighbors, foremost among them Russia, whose size and historical role have repeatedly made it the principal obstacle to Western European expansion.
The unrest sweeping several European countries this autumn marks a new phase in the continent’s systemic crisis as it reflects the convergence of two long-term problems that much of Europe’s political establishment has proved incapable of resolving.
The first is the exhaustion of the socioeconomic model that sustained Western European prosperity throughout the Cold War and its aftermath. That model depended on Europe’s privileged position in the global economy and the absence of serious competitors beyond the Western world, but China’s rise, combined with increasingly limited resources, has undermined those advantages.
Closer economic integration with Russia, and access to its enormous natural wealth, might have offered Western Europe a final opportunity to preserve its exceptional position, but instead regional leaders allowed their own arrogance to prevent an accommodation with Moscow because they couldn’t accept that Russia wished to live peacefully with its neighbors, but on terms consistent with its own interests.
The second problem is Western Europe’s longstanding absence of genuine sovereignty.
Integration into the American-led NATO system has deprived even major powers such as Germany, France, and Britain of the freedom to pursue fundamental political change and one of the alliance’s practical functions has been to preserve the existing political order within its member states.
Any serious attempt to transform that order would require a reassessment of relations with Washington and such independence is something these European governments have long been unwilling, or unable, to contemplate.
Together, these structural weaknesses have left Western Europe’s political and economic establishments effectively paralyzed.
For nearly two decades, governments have substituted the appearance of activity for meaningful reform. Successive emergencies, involving migration, the pandemic, hostility towards Russia, and preparations for military confrontation, have allowed leaders to avoid addressing deeper problem and this helps explain the temptation to interpret today’s unrest as another exercise in political manipulation. Emmanuel Macron, for example, has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to survive the consequences of disastrous decisions through tactical maneuvering.
Yet it would be a mistake to dismiss the protests as artificial or orchestrated.
In France, the initial demonstrations were driven by schoolchildren and university students demanding more teachers and improvements to an education system suffering from declining standards, but these grievances are hardly unique to France and they reflect broader weaknesses in modern education, including funding arrangements that encourage institutions to compete for pupils rather than concentrate on teaching.
By early October, the French protests had expanded as other groups affected by Macron’s liberal economic policies joined the demonstrations. The authorities blamed the political left, while unrest escalated into rioting and looting.
Similar discontent emerged in Spain and Portugal, where soaring housing costs became the immediate trigger. Both countries have spent years occupying subordinate positions within the European Union, with little influence over its economic priorities, even as their former politicians find comfortable positions in Brussels.
Western Europe has consequently entered a period in which conventional political competition is increasingly accompanied by mass protest and the participation of young people is particularly significant.
In France, the EU’s most important military power and its only nuclear-armed member, it was students who provided the initial momentum. While much of the adult electorate has descended into political apathy under Macron, younger generations retain aspirations for a better future and their grievances are genuine. So, too, is the wider crisis that has brought people onto the streets.
There are therefore grounds to believe that public dissatisfaction may eventually bring new political forces to power, which from Russia’s perspective raises an obvious possibility in that perhaps Western Europe’s next generation of leaders will prove more reasonable on questions of security and relations with Moscow.
Such hopes, however, may be premature because they reflect less our actual experience of European politics than our desire to imagine a Western Europe capable of recovering its political judgement.
Indeed, the objective nature of the present crisis makes its possible consequences especially troubling and European history offers little reassurance that profound domestic upheaval produces peaceful relations with neighbouring countries. On the contrary, revolutionary transformations have repeatedly generated external aggression, and the French Revolution provides one example.
The upheavals of the late 18th century were followed by wars against neighboring states and, eventually, Napoleon’s attempt to dominate Europe.
The extraordinary energy released by revolution demanded an outlet, while new rulers also needed resources and opportunities for enrichment beyond their borders.
As Henry Kissinger observed in his early historical work, the internal foundations of Napoleon’s expansionism helped prevent a lasting accommodation with Russia after the disastrous campaign of 1812.
Germany offers an even more destructive precedent, where the political upheavals of the 20th century ultimately brought to power a regime whose ambitions extended far beyond Germany’s borders. The conquest of neighboring countries was followed by an attack on the Soviet Union and the most devastating war in human history.
Again, internal political transformation was accompanied by an effort to direct national energies towards external expansion and the consequences of that war fundamentally altered Europe’s position as many of its leading states lost much of their effective sovereignty and became dependent on the United States for their security.
Paradoxically, that dependence may now offer some protection against the most dangerous consequences of Europe’s internal crisis because governments that lack genuine strategic independence may also lack the freedom to embark upon adventures of their own choosing.
Nevertheless, Russia can’t base its security on the assumption that European political upheaval will produce more sensible leaders even if the temptation to hope for a peaceful transformation of Europe is understandable. Hope isn’t a strategy, and history provides ample grounds for caution.
Russia must therefore prepare not for the miracle of a Western Europe reconciled to peaceful coexistence, but for the possibility that its internal crisis will once again find expression in confrontation abroad.
Whatever political forces eventually emerge from the present turmoil, preparing for a military confrontation with our European neighbors must remain one of Russia’s central strategic priorities.
This article was first published by Vzglyad.ru, translated and edited by the RT team.
