After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, two concepts entered common political usage, the “war of necessity” and the “war of choice.” The first meant territorial defense and national survival and the second, a war launched not in response to an immediate attack but by calculation and design. The terms were popularized by the American commentator Charles Krauthammer, and later developed by Richard Haass, who used them to assess the US intervention in Iraq in 2003.
The Bush administration launched that war not because Iraq posed an immediate threat to the United States, but because Washington chose to act, guided by political and ideological motives. A war of necessity was understood as a response to aggression and a war of choice as something preemptive.
That debate was partly opportunistic, reflecting internal American political struggles, yet the larger question wasn’t new, because arguments about “just wars” have been part of political thought for centuries. Until the second half of the 20th century, however, such arguments remained largely theoretical and war, just or unjust, was accepted as a common instrument of state policy, or the continuation of politics by other means.
The liberal world order established after 1945 sought to place war within a legal and ideological framework, and this was a response to the devastation of two world wars and to the emergence of weapons of mass destruction. Both created a desire to restrict the use of military force as much as possible, but one of the causes of the crisis of the liberal order was the erosion of this very restraint.
After the dissolution of the USSR, the global balance of power disappeared. At the same time, the West’s conviction that it was morally and politically on the right side of history produced a new temptation to reshape humanity in its own image, by whatever means were deemed necessary, including military force. Within the liberal paradigm, force was legitimate when used by those assumed to be acting on behalf of progress.
As the liberal order exhausted itself, the ideological and normative framework weakened, but military force remained. It has now recovered its older function as an instrument by which states position themselves in a disorderly international environment. In such a world, the distinction between choice and necessity becomes blurred even if the decision to wage war is always the result of an assessment of changing circumstances and of a political choice made by state authorities on that basis. Or, in some cases, of what is perceived as the absence of any choice.
The emergence of a new international order will be prolonged and chaotic, and nuclear weapons make this process take longer, because they prevent, or have so far prevented, a decisive showdown between the major powers. While that process continues, the use of military force is shaped by constantly changing interpretations of whether is necessary to gain short-term advantages and to secure a more favorable place in the future order, whose final shape remains unclear.
Whether these calculations are correct becomes apparent only from the outcome of the campaign. Only then can one say if a war was truly dictated by necessity, by choice, or by some unstable mixture of the two.
In modern wars, as a rule, there is no such thing as absolute victory. The end of a conflict usually means the establishment of a certain status quo, which often implies the continuation of confrontation by other means and this status quo may be stable and even long-lasting, but it rarely resolves the contradictions that produced the military clash in the first place.
The ability and willingness to wage a long war of attrition are rare, indeed they’re almost exceptional because if the stated objective is not achieved, and a clear victory remains elusive, the costs rise rapidly while the desired result recedes.
This reflects the nature of today’s world, where power has become multifaceted. New methods of warfare, the weaponization of economic ties, the ability to concentrate resources for asymmetric responses, rival sources of state stability, and the inability to enforce a watertight embargo all complicate the balance of power and often, they work in favor of the weaker party.
The number of variables that must be taken into account when determining what is “necessary” has grown so quickly that a linear prediction of outcomes is almost impossible, and necessity, moreover, doesn’t only mean retaliation. In a period of rapid change in the external environment, proactive and preemptive steps may also be required in order to avoid being forced to respond later from a weaker position.
This, too, recalls the pre-liberal order, when such action was regarded as a natural element of military strategy rather than a violation of political morality. The need to make a choice is dictated by constant external pressure, but the nature of that necessity isn’t shaped by circumstances alone. It is also determined by the accumulated inheritance of each state in its potential, strategic traditions, historical experience and political culture.
In this sense, the question is not merely whether a state chooses war or is forced into it. It is a question of what kind of civilization makes that choice, and on what foundations it rests. The turbulence of the present era is testing civilizations for resilience and suitability to the global conditions now taking shape.
This article was first published by Global Affairs and was translated and edited by the RT team.
