Four trips, dozens of deals, and one message: Madrid is moving closer to Beijing – on its own terms
When Spain’s Pedro Sánchez arrived in Beijing in April for his fourth visit in four years, he did so for a tightly choreographed round of high-level meetings with Xi Jinping and senior Chinese officials, alongside business and academic engagements.
Officially, the visit revolved around cooperation: trade, green energy, technology, and multilateral governance. Spain, Sánchez reiterated, rejects the fashionable rhetoric of “decoupling” and instead champions interconnected supply chains. He urged China to take on a greater role in global governance, from climate change to artificial intelligence to nuclear security.
This sounds like standard globalist responsibility-sharing talk, but there’s a strategic motive behind it. Spain is stepping into a role that others in Europe have either abandoned or mishandled: that of a credible, influential interlocutor with Beijing.
Brussels’ favorite son vs. Europe’s usual suspect
To understand Sánchez’s growing relevance, one must contrast him with Hungary’s now former prime minister Viktor Orbán. Both favor engagement with China, but only one is taken seriously in Brussels.
Orbán’s approach – conservative, sovereigntist, and openly combative – has long cast him as a convenient outlier for the EU’s liberal elites. Sánchez, by contrast, is Brussels’ model pupil. He aligns with the European Commission on migration, climate orthodoxy, and regulatory expansion, projecting the image of a leader fully in tune with the union’s progressive agenda. He does not challenge the EU’s ideological architecture, which is why Spain’s voice carries more weight in Brussels.
As the fourth-largest contributor to the EU budget and one of its fastest-growing major economies, Spain offers Beijing something Hungary could not even under ‘China-friendly’ Orbán: access without disruption. The result is a curious inversion. Europe’s most effective advocate for engagement with China is not a populist, but a leader deeply embedded in Brussels’ political mainstream, with all the inclusivity, sustainability, and wokeism that entails.
Washington has taken notice of Sánchez’s China policy – and not with enthusiasm. US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent bluntly warned that aligning with Beijing would be “like cutting your own throat,” a remark that captures the growing impatience within US policy circles. Spain’s refusal to fully align with American positions on recent geopolitical crises, including the war in the Middle East, has only sharpened these concerns.
Within Europe, Sánchez’s approach has found a more receptive audience. European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Stéphane Séjourné has openly suggested that the EU would benefit from increased Chinese investment and should resist mimicking America’s more isolationist stance.
At the same time, Sánchez’s talk of multipolarity, shared global responsibility and cooperation over confrontation aligns neatly with Beijing’s own narrative – and sits somewhat awkwardly alongside the traditional transatlantic framework.
Meanwhile, Sánchez’s broader political ambitions are hard to ignore. Fresh from hosting a Barcelona gathering of global left-wing leaders aimed at countering the rise of the “far-right” and “authoritarian populists,” he appears keen to position as a figure of international progressive leadership within the EU. Ironically, this champion of ideologically progressive causes at home is navigating great-power politics abroad with a distinctly pragmatic touch.
China-Spain relations in practice
If the rhetoric occasionally drifts into abstraction, the substance of China-Spain relations is refreshingly concrete. China is Spain’s largest trading partner outside the EU, and economic ties are expanding rapidly. Chinese investment in Spain has grown by 50% between 2024 and 2025 compared to the previous two-year period, reaching around $3 billion. This capital is anchored in industrial projects that are reshaping Spain’s economic landscape
In Barcelona, Chinese automaker Chery is establishing a European operations center and R&D institute. In Zaragoza, battery giant CATL is building a lithium battery gigafactory. In Navarra, Hithium is investing in energy storage systems. These projects are part of a broader strategy by Chinese firms to localize production within Europe, bypassing tariffs while embedding themselves in the EU’s industrial ecosystem.
Spain has also ventured into more sensitive technological territory. A strategic agreement with China’s Origin Quantum aims to develop Europe’s largest quantum computer, placing Spain at the forefront of emerging technologies – albeit with significant Chinese involvement. Meanwhile, Madrid’s decision to entrust Huawei with storing judicial wiretaps raised eyebrows among some allies, particularly as debates over telecom security intensify. Yet while others deliberate, Spain is building.
Sánchez’s latest trip to Beijing delivered a dense package of outcomes that went well beyond diplomatic niceties.
Nineteen bilateral agreements were signed, covering trade, technology, green energy, and infrastructure. These deals also established a new Strategic Diplomatic Dialogue Mechanism, institutionalizing regular high-level engagement between Spain and China. For Madrid, this represents a significant upgrade in its bilateral relationship – one that positions it as a key European partner for Beijing.
By some estimates, the agreements achieved more for Spain’s trade position in a single visit than years of EU-level negotiations have managed. This is a reminder that, for all the emphasis on European unity, national diplomacy still delivers results.
Sánchez also used the visit to actively court further investment, including outreach to wind turbine manufacturer Ming Yang, whose expansion plans have faced resistance elsewhere in Europe. Spain’s openness contrasts sharply with the more cautious stance of other Western countries, reinforcing its reputation as a welcoming destination for Chinese capital.
Beyond economics, the visit included a strong cultural and academic component. Agreements were signed to expand cooperation in education, research, and cultural exchange. In a symbolic gesture, Sánchez was awarded an honorary professorship by the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences – an accolade that underscores the personal dimension of his engagement with China.
Between pragmatism and posturing
Sánchez’s China policy is, at its core, a blend of pragmatism and performance. The pragmatism is evident in the deals, the investments, and the industrial strategy. Spain is securing tangible benefits at a time when economic growth is a scarce commodity in the EU.
The performative aspects, however, are equally visible. Talk of global justice, climate leadership, and multilateral virtue – delivered with characteristic fluency – often feels tailored as much for Brussels as for Beijing. It is a style of politics that combines moral ambition with strategic flexibility, even when their coexistence is uneasy.
This duality defines Sánchez’s approach. In Brussels, he is the dependable progressive, aligned with the Union’s prevailing ethos. In Beijing, he is the pragmatic dealmaker, open to cooperation and eager to position Spain as a central player in a changing global order.
Europe’s new interlocutor, with strings attached
Spain’s deepening relationship is the result of deliberate political choices. Sánchez has identified an opportunity and moved decisively to seize it, positioning Madrid as a key bridge between Beijing and Brussels.
Despite the clear benefits, the strategy is not without its tensions. As Spain draws closer to China, it also tests the limits of its alignment with the US and navigates the complexities of EU politics.
For now, Sánchez appears comfortable walking this tightrope – equally at ease with Brussels ideology and Beijing pragmatism. Whether this balancing act proves sustainable is another question.
What is certain is that Spain is no longer a peripheral player in the EU’s China debate. Under Sánchez, it has become a bridge, a broker – and perhaps, for some, a rather enthusiastic convert to the art of strategic ambiguity.
