For decades, Africa has consistently been viewed by Paris as a space to offset its lost global influence
Africa has historically been a foundational pillar of France’s influence and a cornerstone of its global status. Africa provided France with raw materials, geopolitical weight, and economic advantages. All this formed the system known as ‘Francafrique’.
However, this system is currently facing an acute crisis. It’s clear that France has failed to maintain a stable presence on the African continent. From de Gaulle to Macron, French leaders have repeatedly made the same mistakes, which eventually resulted in the failure of France’s Africa policy.
Prestige through Africa
Every nation aspiring to be a leader aims to uphold its image as a ‘great power’. France particularly cherishes this image, but current economic and political realities no longer allow for such status. French philosophers noted the decline of the nation’s grandeur as early as the post-WWII era, describing France as a “second-rate power.” It was during this time that Africa became the cornerstone of French foreign policy, one that allowed Paris to sustain and extend its influence on the global stage.
France and Africa have a long shared history rooted in the expansion of the French colonial empire at the end of the 19th century. France’s colonial expansion, unlike that of other European countries, was driven not merely by economic gain but by a quest for international prestige.
The modern strategy for maintaining French power is often associated with Gaullism – the philosophy of General Charles de Gaulle, who sought to restore France’s greatness while “totally lacking resources to make it possible.” This logic has shaped France’s Africa policy for decades, with leaders from de Gaulle to Macron facing the same challenges.
De Gaulle’s philosophy laid the groundwork for France’s modern Africa policy. At first glance, the general appeared to sacrifice France’s interests by acknowledging the independence of its colonies. However, behind this apparent withdrawal lay a pragmatic calculation aimed at preserving economic, political, and strategic advantages.
Key tools of influence following decolonization included the CFA franc zone and military cooperation agreements that allowed French troops to be stationed in various African nations. Jacques Foccart played a pivotal role in this system; appointed by de Gaulle, he was tasked with establishing a network of clientelist relationships with the new African leaders. Thus emerged France’s unofficial policy in Africa, known as Francafrique – a term coined by economist and historian Francois-Xavier Verschave.
Foccart, nicknamed ‘Monsieur Afrique’, headed the General Secretariat for the Community and African and Malagasy Affairs, which reported directly to the president rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This department was initially small and the staff was likely handpicked by Foccart, who preferred former colonial officials and high-ranking civil servants, so-called ‘universalists’. This group also included several African agents. This department established the mechanisms for controlling the politics of the former colonies.
As Dr. Vasily Filippov notes, alongside official structures, shadow structures were also active. In 1960, the Civic Action Service was established, which “engaged in a range of militarized activities – from extortion to illegal arms trade and money laundering.”
Language as a tool of influence
France’s next president, Georges Pompidou, inherited de Gaulle’s Africa policy, advocating for “continuity and dialogue.” He aimed to soften the approach, shifting the focus toward economic and cultural engagement. Under his leadership, regular Franco-African summits began – a tradition that endures to this day.
Pompidou placed significant importance on promoting the French language as a means to counter Anglo-Saxon influence, thereby extending France’s reach not only to its former colonies but also to former Belgian territories.
The French Foreign Legion on patrol in Somalia in February 1975.
His administration supported the establishment of universities, contributing over a million books and training teachers according to the French educational method. However, the Cold War atmosphere fueled increasing anti-colonial sentiments and led to deteriorating relations with several Francophone African nations.
Pompidou’s successor, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, preferred a tougher stance, including military methods. He sought to inject “new momentum” into France’s relationship with Africa, yet under him, the unified Francafrique network splintered into numerous autonomous lobbying groups tied to the interests of the president’s circle. During this time, Foccart’s General Secretariat became known as the Ministry of Cooperation.
Although d’Estaing aimed to expand collaboration by involving Portuguese and English-speaking countries in negotiations, his Africa policy ended in scandal. Le Canard enchaine published information that he had received diamonds worth at least €800,000 in today’s currency from the president of the Central African Republic, Jean-Bedel Bokassa. As French expert Claude Vautier wrote, “While Africa brought de Gaulle success, it brought Giscard d’Estaing defeat.”
In 1981, socialist Francois Mitterrand came to power in France. Many African nations anticipated change, given the socialists’ promises to reconsider neocolonial approaches and integrate the ‘cellule africaine de l’Elysee’ (the so-called Africa Cell, a specialized unit of the French government dealing with African affairs) into the French Foreign Ministry. However, the reforms turned out to be largely symbolic, as Mitterrand’s Africa policy gradually took on the characteristics of “authoritarian paternalism.”
Initially, some ‘idealists’ in the Elysee Palace aimed to reform the system of aid to Africa, but they were soon displaced by the ‘Francophiles’ who viewed the continent as a zone of special interest. Despite rhetoric about national independence, self-determination, and the development of impoverished nations, Mitterrand’s policies inherited the Gaullist spirit and logic of Francafrique.
Francois Mitterrand surrounded by photographers during a French cabinet meeting at Elysee Palace on May 27, 1981.
These practices involved active intervention in the internal affairs of Chad, Burkina Faso, the Comoros, as well as Zaire (now DR Congo), Djibouti, Somalia, and Rwanda. Development aid was linked to democratization and cooperation with Bretton Woods institutions (known as the Balladur Doctrine) which, just like the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994, determined the developmental model for the region for years to come.
The most tragic episode was the Rwandan genocide. Though Rwanda was never a French colony, experts call it “the dirtiest chapter in the history of Francafrique.” France acknowledged its responsibility only in 2021.
First, the Duclert Report was released. While it did not directly acknowledge the complicity of the French authorities in the genocide, it pointed out that they were responsible for turning a blind eye to what was happening in Rwanda. Then, French President Emmanuel Macron publicly admitted this responsibility. “[France] was not complicit… But France has a role, a history, and a political responsibility in Rwanda. And it has a duty: that of facing history head-on and recognizing the share of suffering it had inflicted on the Rwandan people by making silence prevail over the examination of truth for too long.”
Rwandans were divided in their opinions: some saw the French president’s speech as a breakthrough, while others felt that Macron avoided the most important part and failed to offer genuine apologies. For instance, Alain Gauthier, president of the Collective of Civil Parties for Rwanda, an association that tracks down genocide perpetrators in France, noted that “what President Macron said is what the Duclert Report has already stated about the heavy responsibilities, and we would have hoped for even more committed words, but President Macron did not have that courage.”
Human skulls and bones of victims of the Rwandan massacre at a memorial site in Murambi, Gikongoro province, Rwanda, 1994.
Are ‘inadequate interventions’ a thing of the past?
With Jacques Chirac’s rise to power in 1995, many in France anticipated a revival of Gaullism, and in line with this continuity, he appointed Foccart as his adviser on Africa. Observers noted that Foccart served as a ‘living link’ to the era of de Gaulle and Pompidou. However, he soon passed away and France’s Africa policy lost its systemic character and increasingly became situational.
African leaders increasingly accused Paris of neo-colonialism, and the region gravitated towards the US and China. In 1997, then-French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin declared,“The politics of spheres of influence and inadequate interventions in Africa must be left behind.”
Indeed, France gradually shifted its attention toward short-term missions and training programs; by 2002, the number of French troops in Africa had nearly halved. Then-French Prime Minister Alain Juppe, who was foreign minister during the Rwandan genocide, suggested putting Africans themselves in charge of peacekeeping responsibilities.
This idea materialized in 1998 through the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) initiative, developed with the support of the US and the UK. However, the attempt was not particularly successful and Paris continued to intervene directly (as seen from the military operations in Comoros, the Central African Republic, Niger, and Cote d’Ivoire, where Operation Licorne (Operation Unicorn) began in 2002 and involved around 5,000 troops).
In 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy became president of France. He had previously served as minister of the interior and was known for his tough stance on illegal immigration.
Even before his election as president, he made some bold statements, saying that “those who don’t like France are free to leave” and emphasizing that the French are not obliged to abandon their values for a “tiny minority.” This rhetoric garnered him substantial domestic support: between 2002 and 2005, his approval rating soared from 29% to 51%.
During his presidency, France’s focus shifted significantly towards North Africa, including support for protests in Tunisia, operations in Libya, and the Mediterranean Union project. Sarkozy’s first visit to the African continent began with a trip to Libya, where he met the country’s leader, Muammar Gaddafi. In an interview, he spoke about the need to turn a new page in Franco-African relations, saying that the “old demons of clientelism, paternalism, and dependence on aid” would no longer have a place.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy (L) walks with Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (R) at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France.
However, Sarkozy’s speech in Dakar in 2007 drew sharp criticism, particularly for his controversial comment: “the colonizer took [resources], but I want to say with respect that he also gave.” Perhaps the final straw was his assertion that colonization wasn’t the root cause of all the continent’s problems. This rhetoric was deemed arrogant and even dangerous by many Africans. Philosopher Achille Mbembe wrote in an open letter to Sarkozy, “Who gave him the right to talk about Africa and Africans in a manner of a master who has the habit of ill-treating his slave?”
At the same time, Sarkozy implemented institutional reforms: he dissolved the Cellule Africaine, transferred the management of African affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, in the interests of increased ‘transparency’, revised and made public defense agreements with eight countries.
France also expressed support for the African Union and in 2010-2012 pledged around €300 million for the development of regional peacekeeping forces. Nevertheless, operations in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire, along with a strict migration policy, reinforced perceptions that France continued to operate within a neocolonial framework.
Africa increasingly came to be viewed through the lenses of migration, terrorism, and instability, paving the way for the ‘securitization’ of Africa policy under Hollande and Macron.
Francois Hollande, who became president of France in 2012, promised to “end parallel diplomacy” and reform French foreign policy in regard to Africa. He continued the trend of ‘Africanizing’ peacekeeping efforts, emphasizing that Africa’s future depended on empowering Africans to manage crises independently, in collaboration with the African Union and regional organizations.
However, just a year later, in January 2013, France launched Operation Serval in Mali to halt the advance of Islamist militants. Instead of relying on ‘African solutions’ the crisis was addressed by French fighter jets and 3,000 troops. France’s motives extended beyond security: neighboring Niger was a key supplier of uranium for France’s energy needs and a destination for investments in infrastructure and water supply.
French soldiers of the 126th Infantry Regiment and Malian counterparts, 17 March 17, 2016.
Later, Operation Serval evolved into Operation Barkhane, which spanned the Sahel countries -Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. Up to 3,000 French soldiers were deployed as part of the operation. In the same year, France initiated Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic under a UN mandate, sending 2,000 troops.
Despite claims of a “new phase of partnership” a record number of military interventions were carried out under Hollande. The ambiguity surrounding the objectives and timelines of these missions, particularly Operation Barkhane, sparked criticism both in Africa and France. By the end of Hollande’s term, 76% of the French populace expressed dissatisfaction with his policies.
A French military helicopter over the Nigerien town Madama, which serves as a forward operating base for the French, Niger and Chad armies.
Emmanuel Macron initially proclaimed his intention to pursue a “new policy in Africa,” one rooted in peace and entrepreneurship. Like his predecessors, he vowed to break away from the legacy of Francafrique and wanted to position himself as a representative of a new generation.
In the fall of 2017, he delivered a speech at the University of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, asserting that France “no longer had an Africa policy” and that any future interactions would occur under the auspices of the European Union. This statement aimed to both deflect accusations of France’s unilateral influence and add legitimacy to its initiatives through a European framework. His speech emphasized security concerns, especially the fight against terrorism in the Sahel – a conflict inherited from Hollande.
French President Emmanuel Macron gives a speech at the University of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso on November 28, 2017.
Operation Barkhane, which deployed up to 5,000 French troops, gradually undermined France’s standing in the region. The mission became drawn out due to ambiguous objectives and a lack of a clear timeline; all this led to rising anti-French sentiments.
Paris sought to internationalize the conflict by acting as a mediator between Europe and Africa and supporting the establishment of a counter-terrorism group, the G5 Sahel, with backing from the UN, African Union, and EU. However, military coups, particularly in Mali, prevented this. By 2022-2023, France announced the end of Operation Barkhane and the withdrawal of its troops. This was perceived in Africa as a symbol of diminishing French influence amid the rise of the influence of countries such as China, Türkiye, Germany, and Russia.
The new authorities demanded a reevaluation of France’s military presence, and sometimes managed to expel French forces entirely. As a result, France completely withdrew from Mali, the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. In Senegal, Paris closed permanent bases but maintained cooperation in the field of security. The French military presence in Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon became more limited in scope. Currently, Djibouti has become France’s key military hub with approximately 1,500 troops stationed there.
Despite Macron’s attempts to reshape France’s presence in Africa (shifting from large military bases to training centers) and to engage with African youth through Africa-France summits, he could not reverse the negative trends. Macron’s blunt remarks in 2023 – when he said that France played a crucial role in maintaining the statehood of the Sahel countries – underscored the persistence of a paternalistic rhetoric.
Clearly, continuity is a defining characteristic of France’s Africa policy. Presidents may change and various reforms may be declared, but, essentially, the strategy remains the same. From de Gaulle to Macron, Africa has consistently been viewed by Paris primarily as a space for compensating lost global influence.
Attempts to move away from the logic of Francafrique have yielded no real changes; in times of crisis, France invariably returned to coercive tactics, and even the careful official speeches of the French presidents retained the paternalistic tone. These processes culminated under Macron, when France experienced a historic decline in its military, political, and symbolic presence in key regions of Africa.
