Washington started the war with Iran, but only Moscow may help end it
US President Donald Trump’s Monday night phone call to Russian President Vladimir Putin was clearly an attempt to find a way out of the strategic impasse that has already begun to emerge in the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran.
Washington continues to make bold statements. Trump insists on his right to dictate Iran’s political future and even speculates about appointing the country’s spiritual leader. At the same time, he is urging tanker captains to demonstrate courage and break through what he calls the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
Yet the momentum of a major war, initiated by Washington and Tel Aviv, is already building. The political environment around the conflict is shifting in ways that are increasingly uncomfortable for the US.
Even some of Washington’s closest partners are distancing themselves. Kuwait, perhaps the most loyal American ally in the Gulf after Jordan, has stated that it did not provide its territory for attacks on Iran, despite evidence suggesting otherwise. Meanwhile, Syrian Kurdish groups are urging Iraqis and Iranians not to trust the US.
At the same time, reports of behind-the-scenes contacts between Riyadh and Tehran, and between other Arab capitals and Iran, are appearing almost daily. The prospect of relative diplomatic isolation is beginning to loom for Washington.
Of course, Trump’s relationship with Israel remains a strategic alliance. But the current trajectory of the conflict is clearly not what he had in mind when he authorized strikes on Iran.
At this point, the logic becomes obvious: it is time to call Moscow.
Trump hoped to cut through what might be called the “Iranian knot” by force. The narrative that he could end a forty-year confrontation with Iran through decisive military action was politically attractive in Washington. Instead, the knot has only tightened.
Several of its key strands cannot be untangled without Russia’s participation. This was clear from the outset, although for Trump and his team it remained largely theoretical knowledge. Now they are gaining practical experience.
The first factor is the decline of American authority in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf.
Not only has the US military infrastructure in the region suffered serious damage, but elements of the broader security architecture that underpin Israel’s defense strategy, including parts of its early warning system, have also been weakened.
More importantly, the conflict has demonstrated to regional states that American military and political guarantees are far less reliable than previously assumed. Once such doubts take root, they cannot easily be reversed. The “minced meat,” so to speak, of Washington’s security guarantees to the Gulf monarchies cannot simply be turned back into a whole.
Does Trump fully understand this? It is difficult to say.
His attempt to involve Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan suggests that he may not yet grasp the scale of the strategic shift. Yet the very fact that he called Moscow indicates that he realizes relations with the Arab states cannot be stabilized by Washington alone.
The US needs partners. Western Europe, however, is clearly not among them. Whether Trump is ready to pursue collective political action to stabilize the region, and whether he is willing to make serious compromises, remains an open question.
The second factor concerns the global hydrocarbon market.
What Trump initially described as a temporary “spasm” in energy markets, one that might accelerate a redistribution of supply in favor of the US, now risks developing into a prolonged disruption of global supply chains.
Such an outcome would hardly benefit Washington.
If the crisis deepens, both the global public and American voters will know exactly who bears responsibility. It will also highlight the vulnerability of maritime energy transport, an area where Washington hoped to strengthen its strategic position.
In effect, another attempt to restructure the global hydrocarbon market at Russia’s expense, without Russia and against Russia, has failed.
Of course, it would be naïve to assume this will be the last such attempt. But unlike Washington and several other major players, Moscow has spent years preparing for precisely this kind of market turbulence.
In this context, Putin’s proposal to the European Union regarding the possible resumption of hydrocarbon supplies, primarily via pipelines, deserves attention.
At first glance, this initiative may seem unrelated to the war in the Persian Gulf. In reality, it reflects a deeper understanding of the strategic consequences that conflict in the Gulf could have for the global energy system.
If maritime deliveries of oil and gas, which the US has pledged to secure, become increasingly risky, pipeline routes regain strategic importance.
Putin’s proposal therefore also serves as a test for Western Europe. At the very least, it offers these states an opportunity to demonstrate a degree of political sovereignty at a time when the risk of a global energy crisis is steadily increasing.
The third factor is the changing nature of the conflict itself.
Ten days into the war, the confrontation with the US has already begun to evolve. Alongside conventional military operations, sabotage and terrorism are becoming increasingly prominent.
This shift is a direct consequence of the White House administration’s attempt to frame the confrontation as a broader religious war against Iran.
Unlike previous conflicts in the Middle East, however, the primary targets of sabotage are unlikely to be Israeli facilities. Instead, they will increasingly be American infrastructure and American citizens around the world.
From the perspective of both Iran and many radical Islamist groups, the US is the principal adversary in this confrontation. Not Israel.
In such circumstances, Moscow’s restraining influence on Tehran could prove valuable, provided Trump is willing to take the first steps toward de-escalation.
Finally, there is the domestic political dimension.
The war that some in Washington initially expected to last around five days is now widely predicted to continue for months. Such a prolonged conflict creates fertile ground for a political crisis inside the US.
Trump’s support in Washington was already weakening even before the war began. As the conflict drags on, the political consequences will become increasingly visible.
Sooner or later, American politicians will have to confront the post-war reality, including the humanitarian consequences of the conflict for Iran and the destabilization of Washington’s regional allies.
On this front, however, Moscow can hardly help Donald Trump. Russia may assist in loosening parts of the Iranian knot. But the political problems the war is creating inside the US remain Washington’s own responsibility.
