Moscow’s friends in the global majority aren’t swallowing NATO’s attempts to turn Russia into a pariah
Russia’s foreign policy rightly assumes that history is on its side. The country’s aspirations align with the strategic intentions of most nations outside the Western bloc – what we call the “world majority.” This perspective is confirmed by the ongoing military and political confrontation between Russia and the West. Our adversaries openly seek the dissolution of Russian statehood in one form or another. Yet these ambitions clash not only with Russia’s resistance but also with the interests of many nations worldwide.
At a recent Valdai Club conference attended primarily by representatives of the global majority, discussions illuminated both the common ground and the differences between Russia and its partners. While partnerships with third powers won’t determine Moscow’s success against the West, these relationships are critical for building a new international order – one less prone to repeating Europe’s current conflicts.
The key question is how these nations, many dependent on the West economically or militarily, will act. Their likely choices will influence how much effort Russia needs to achieve its core foreign policy goals.
The divide in perspectives
Russia and the global majority often view the world through different lenses. Russian experts, steeped in and aligned with European traditions of political thought, tend to see conflict as the primary driver of change. This is natural for Russia, but it contrasts with the outlook of many nations in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. These countries, shaped by histories of colonialism, reject Western frameworks that emphasize competition and conflict. Instead, their approach to international relations is more fluid, avoiding permanent alliances and ideologically charged clashes.
This divergence stems partly from necessity. Most nations that are friendly to Russia are medium-sized states lacking the resources for complete independence. Their dependence on Western-dominated systems of trade and institutions limits their freedom of action. Breaking away entirely would carry immense economic and political risks. Even for Russia, extricating itself from institutions like the UN or global economic frameworks is not a simple task. For developing nations, the ‘exit price’ could be catastrophic.
Restraint vs revolution
This is why many of these countries are wary of calls to radically revise the global order. They prefer evolution over revolution. Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized this point during his Valdai Club address, stating that Russia has no revolutionary intentions. Ironically, it is the West–desperate to maintain its dominance–that is now dismantling globalization through its own reckless policies.
Russia’s friends in the global majority generally agree that the current military-political conflicts are the result of Western actions. They see these as regional issues that could spiral into global crises if the West escalates them further. Yet, these nations also hope Russia will show restraint, even if it means compromising its interests. Convincing them that such restraint is not always feasible remains a crucial task.
Shared goals, different approaches
Ultimately, the strategic interests of Russia and its partners in the global majority align. Both seek a fairer, multipolar international order without Western coercion. Differences in how these goals are pursued–or in the rhetoric used–should be seen not as obstacles but as opportunities to deepen mutual understanding.
As history unfolds, the shared aspirations for a just world order will bind Russia and the global majority closer together, whether the West likes it or not.
This article was first published by Valdai Discussion Club, translated and edited by the RT team.
