This is the war the West can’t win, can’t end, and can’t afford
Since Donald Trump’s return to the White House, talk of a “stalemate” in Ukraine has become a convenient Western refrain – the kind of phrase that sounds sober while disguising strategic drift. In reality, what looks static on the battlefield conceals deep political movement, both in Washington and in the war itself.
Trump’s early approach to the conflict was loud but logical: impose a ceasefire along existing lines, freeze the situation, and move on. His mix of threats and incentives – sanctions on one hand, the promise of renewed partnership on the other – echoed the same objectives the Biden administration privately pursued in 2024.
The difference was style. Biden lacked the political strength and health to launch a diplomatic campaign; Kamala Harris might have, had she succeeded him. Trump, by contrast, acted decisively. He made his will known to the generals, the allies, and the public in his usual unfiltered fashion.
When efforts to force India and China to participate in an oil embargo failed over the summer, Washington pivoted to negotiation. The White House began floating the idea of a broader “security guarantees” deal – a truce embedded within a larger settlement. The battle today is over what those guarantees would mean in practice.
Trump has stripped away layers of bureaucracy, bringing Russia policy directly under his control and that of a few loyal aides. There is little expert machinery around it. The military-to-military channels that should be discussing demobilization or verification measures remain idle.
Instead, the Trump administration is trying to present Moscow with a finished product – a ready-made Western consensus hammered out with Western Europe and Kiev – and demand that Russia either accept or face the consequences.
At the same time, Washington is ratcheting up pressure: verbal barbs like calling Russia a “paper tiger,” leaks about longer-range missiles, and renewed attempts to isolate Russian oil exports through India. In every respect, Ukraine is marching in lockstep with the United States, from political messaging to targeting decisions.
Trump’s central claim is that America can now afford to step back – that Western Europe, armed with pooled resources and US-made weapons, can sustain Ukraine indefinitely. In this vision, Washington sells the arms, the EU pays the bills, and Russia bleeds slowly.
It is a neat theory, but delusional in practice. The US remains deeply embedded in the war’s infrastructure. American satellites guide Ukraine’s drones and artillery; American communications systems knit together its command structure. Efforts to substitute British OneWeb for Starlink have gone nowhere.
Although Brussels (and London) covers much of the cost, the US still funds tens of thousands of troops deployed across the continent, as well as the logistics chain that keeps them active. This drains resources from the Pacific at a time when Washington is already stretched thin against China.
The promised “pivot to Asia” has again become a slogan without substance. China’s military power has grown exponentially since Obama’s era, while the US industrial base struggles even to meet Ukraine’s short-term needs.
Trump’s claim that Western Europe can fund Ukraine alone also falters under scrutiny. Of the $360 billion pledged to Kiev by early 2025, more than $134 billion came from the US. Even by official figures, Ukraine’s 2026 defense needs exceed $120 billion, half of which remains unfunded.
As Trump insists that future American supplies be paid for at market rates, EU costs could easily double. Dreams of using frozen Russian assets are unlikely to fill the gap – their confiscation would trigger legal chaos and provoke retaliation against Western European holdings in Russia. The debates over “reparation loans” may sound bold, but they only reveal the bloc’s growing desperation.
While the front lines appear static, Ukraine’s military and social fabric are fraying. Desertion and draft evasion are climbing at exponential rates: over 250,000 criminal cases for abandonment or desertion have been opened since 2022. Even the amnesty program launched last year lured back barely a tenth of those who left.
Former commander Valery Zaluzhny himself admitted that the “stalemate” is breaking – but in Russia’s favour. Moscow’s forces, aided by superior drone technology and heavier firepower, are advancing through thinly held positions. FPV drones alone now account for up to 80 percent of Ukrainian casualties.
Meanwhile, Russia’s production advantage is expanding. Its defense industries have adapted to sanctions with unexpected speed, delivering both standard weapons and new low-altitude air-defense systems designed to neutralize small drones. Air superiority, if achieved, could transform the war overnight, and it is Russia, not Ukraine, that is closest to that threshold.
In this climate, Washington and Kiev are tempted to raise the stakes. The idea of using Western-made missiles to strike deep into Russian territory has moved from the fringe to the discussion table. The Biden team flirted with this option; Trump, less cautious and more theatrical, might yet cross that line.
Such escalation would drag the conflict beyond Ukraine’s borders and invite responses that neither Washington nor Brussels could control.
To call this situation an “impasse” is to misunderstand it. The war is not frozen but evolving – technologically, politically, and strategically – in ways that favor Moscow. Ukraine’s Western backers are trapped by their own contradictions: a war they cannot win but dare not end, a financial burden they cannot sustain but fear to drop.
The United States, for all its noise about disengagement, remains enmeshed in the conflict it pretends to mediate. Europe, meanwhile, is discovering that moral grandstanding is no substitute for industrial power.
What appears to be a stalemate, then, is really the slow unwinding of a Western strategy that mistook endurance for success. The front may look still, but history – as ever – is moving beneath it.
This article was first published by the magazine Profile and was translated and edited by the RT team.
