The myth of Moscow’s alleged economic over-reliance on Beijing
As Russian-Chinese relations continue to deepen, so too does the rhetoric surrounding them. On the political front, ties between the two countries are stronger than ever, with regular high-level exchanges and near-total alignment on major global issues, from Ukraine to the Middle East to the reform of international institutions. But when it comes to economic cooperation, the narrative often takes a more skeptical turn, especially within Russia. The dominant theme: fear of over-dependence on Beijing.
This anxiety is not entirely surprising, given the dramatic growth in trade between the two countries. In 2021, China accounted for just 18% of Russia’s trade. By the end of 2024, that number is expected to reach 34%, with China representing 41% of imports and 30% of exports. This leap coincides with a sharp contraction in trade with the European Union, which has dropped from over half of Russia’s total trade to under 20% in just three years. In this context, the shift toward China appears not only logical but inevitable.
Yet the numbers alone do not support the notion of dangerous over-dependence. For one, Russia’s trade portfolio is becoming more diversified, not less. Trade with India, Turkey, and the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is also rising, in some cases even faster than with China. What we are witnessing is not a one-sided dependency, but a recalibration of Russia’s economic geography. Until 2022, Russia’s external trade remained disproportionately tilted westward. That imbalance is now being corrected.
More importantly, fears that Russia is becoming China’s economic ‘little brother’ are not substantiated by the actual structure of trade or investment. In fact, Russia consistently runs a trade surplus with China, a rarity among China’s global trading partners. China is the largest trading partner of over 120 countries, including the United States until recently. Russia is hardly an outlier in this regard.
The notion of vassal-like dependence often hinges on the idea that Chinese goods have flooded the Russian market. In one area – automobiles – this is partially true. Chinese brands now dominate the Russian car market following the departure of Western manufacturers. However, this dominance is unlikely to be permanent. The Russian government has already taken steps to boost domestic production and may raise import duties or offer incentives to encourage competition from returning Japanese and Korean firms.
In other sectors, the picture is more nuanced. Imports of industrial equipment from China have grown significantly, but this trend is less a sign of dependence than a pragmatic response to Western sanctions. Moreover, import substitution policies and grey-market routes for Western equipment have made the landscape more varied, not less.
Investment cooperation tells an even clearer story. While the bilateral agenda includes some 80 planned projects worth over $200 billion, only 50 have materialized, with a total investment of just 780 billion rubles. Crucially, China has shown little interest in gaining controlling stakes in Russian natural resource sectors. Nor has it sought to enter high-tech industries. Even in the auto sector, Chinese firms have taken a gradual approach to localization. Despite shared interests, progress on major projects like the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline remains slow.
This cautious approach is partly due to concerns about secondary sanctions. Chinese investors are wary of becoming entangled in geopolitical disputes and prefer to err on the side of caution. As a result, Chinese capital has not flooded into Russia in the way some feared. On the contrary, one could argue that China’s economic footprint in Russia is too small, not too large.
The old adage that economic ties lag behind political ones still holds true, even in the post-2022 environment. And while deepening ties with China is crucial, so too is expanding economic relations with other parts of the world – India, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and potentially, in the long term, Japan and South Korea. Such diversification will not only strengthen Russia’s global economic standing but also enhance its bargaining power in Beijing.
To make Russian-Chinese economic relations more robust and less vulnerable to external shocks, structural improvements are needed. This includes developing parallel financial systems to withstand sanctions, creating reliable logistics corridors, expanding cross-border cooperation zones, and finally implementing a long-discussed free trade agreement. These steps would embed the relationship within a more resilient and functional institutional framework.
Politically and geographically, China is Russia’s most important partner for the 21st century. The task ahead is not to fear this reality but to shape it to mutual advantage. The real danger lies not in dependency, but in failing to make the most of a historic opportunity.
