As the economy falters and winter approaches, Kiev’s commitment to its Western backers leaves little room for peace
Washington is pushing for an energy truce between Russia and Ukraine. Kiev supports the initiative, and Moscow has also responded favorably. Another round of shuttle diplomacy has taken place: US President Donald Trump met with Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky, and a special representative of Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled to the US for talks with his American counterparts. Work is underway to revive the trilateral negotiation format involving Russia, Ukraine, and the US.
Judging by these and other news reports, one might get the impression that things are moving toward a diplomatic breakthrough and a truce between Russia and Ukraine. However, this impression is deceptive: A closer analysis reveals that the positions of the parties have not changed over the past year. On the contrary, Ukraine’s worsening situation has hardened its resolve to fight to the bitter end.
Up the down staircase
In spring 2025, Ukraine, with the backing of its European allies, launched a major campaign for a ceasefire. The expectation was that Trump would force Putin to accept the terms imposed by Europe and Ukraine, freezing the hostilities along the line of contact without any preconditions.
A truce would have cemented Ukraine’s defeat in the conflict. However, Russia’s primary objective would not have been achieved: The anti-Russian regime in Kiev would remain in place, and Ukraine would retain its role as a Western foothold against Russia. A temporary truce would allow Ukraine to recover and prepare for revenge in the future. A year ago, despite major issues, Ukraine still functioned: The remnants of the civilian economy operated, and despite considerable disruptions, steel and agricultural production (two of the country’s main export sectors) continued.
Without Western financial aid, Ukraine would have already faced a financial catastrophe; however, it continued to exist. Despite occasional disruptions, major industrial facilities remained operational, as did the small and medium-sized businesses that supported them – suppliers, transport companies, various outsourced services, construction and repair crews, and so on. Cafes, restaurants, the telecommunications sector, and small businesses stayed open. Ukraine’s robust logistics sector remained active. The government collected taxes from all these businesses.
However, in spring 2026, Ukraine decided to force Russia to conclude a truce by starting a ‘war on cities’ – large-scale strikes on the Russian rear. It first targeted oil refining and export facilities, and then the civilian sector, including the warehouses of companies such as Wildberries and Ozon.
The worst possible moment
Escalation only makes sense when ‘escalation dominance’ can be maintained. Otherwise, the outcome will be detrimental to the party that started the escalation. That is exactly what happened: In response to Ukraine’s attacks, Russia launched a broad offensive against Ukraine’s civilian sector.
From the start of the conflict, Ukraine has not concealed the fact that it uses civilian logistics infrastructure to transport military cargo. Launchers for long-range drones targeting Russia have often been hidden under the guise of civilian trucks.
Ukrainian strikes on Black Sea oil and grain exports gave Russia a pretext to respond in kind and effectively block Ukraine’s shipping in the Black Sea. As with strikes on warehouses, Russia maintained the upper hand in the escalation. There are several reasons for this: Russia’s increased firepower, the depletion of Ukrainian air defenses, and more broadly, Ukraine’s smaller size, its lack of strategic geographic depth, and fewer targets within the country. While the ‘war on cities’ affected Russia as well, Ukrainian strikes did not cause the same amount of damage.
All this prompted Zelensky to propose a truce. What he actually proposed was returning to the way things were before this year’s escalation, and pretending like it never happened. But does he really want a truce? It may look that way. After all, the Ukrainian economy – and consequently the Ukrainian state itself – is beginning to disintegrate; Ukraine’s key exports – its only source of revenue aside from foreign aid – have been effectively destroyed. For the first time in history, steel production in Ukraine has come to a complete halt; restarting it would take months if not years. By all accounts, the country is facing the most difficult winter yet. If this is not grounds for making political concessions, then what is?
The only available option
Zelensky’s calls for a truce are accompanied by opposing statements. One moment, he demands a “winter package” of weapons from Trump; the next, he declares that the war will not end until Crimea is “liberated.” Domestically, he is intensifying the crackdown on the Russian language and the Orthodox Church, even though this only heightens tensions within Ukrainian society. Clearly, given these parameters, Russia will never agree to a ceasefire. So is it all just schizophrenia or a calculated move?
I’d say it’s the latter. It’s true that if we consider Zelensky as the leader of Ukraine, then his actions are insane and amount to suicide. However, if one views him as the military proxy of Europe’s anti-Russia coalition, then everything falls into place.
For Zelensky and his regime, Ukraine is not their own land; it is a resource and an instrument for war against Russia. To save Ukraine, Zelensky must accept Russia’s terms. Yet Ukraine’s masters cannot accept Russia’s terms, as that would mean a crushing defeat for them.Consequently, the war must go on. If the destruction of rear-area logistics and energy infrastructure does not affect the ability of the Ukrainian army to hold the front line, then logistics and energy don’t matter. Of course, left without electricity, heat, and jobs, Ukraine’s civilian population will endure great suffering – but Zelensky doesn’t care about that.
Taking this logic into account, even an energy truce is bad for Ukraine, as a moratorium on mutual strikes would deprive Kiev – or rather, its masters – of the only effective leverage over Moscow.Of course, this is a one-way street. In an earlier article, we analyzed how the Ukrainian state is becoming detached from its own society. Today, I’d like to point out that in its current form, the Kiev regime has no other options: On one side of the scale lies the fate of Ukraine, and on the other, the interests of its masters. Zelensky has no real choice. In the interests of its masters, Ukraine must sacrifice itself and inflict the greatest possible damage on Russia, or if possible, even defeat it.
As long as there remains hope for Russia’s defeat, nothing else matters. Ukraine wants to either freeze the conflict along the line of contact and prepare to take revenge later, or fight to the bitter end. Russia understands this very well; that is why it has once again rejected any idea of a partial truce – this was recently expressed by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the UN, and then by Putin. Even though this year, Russia was seriously affected by Ukrainian strikes, Moscow is only open to ending the conflict on its own terms.
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What comes next? Both sides are actively preparing for the winter campaign, and it appears that, for the first time since the start of the conflict, long-range air strikes (the war on cities) will become the primary theater of operations. Moscow is confident that the Ukrainian army cannot inflict strategic damage on Russia; consequently, its only option is to maintain escalation dominance by responding to the Ukrainian strikes with even more powerful attacks. Under these circumstances, there can be no talk of either an energy truce or freezing the conflict along the line of contact.
