The E1 project has put the UAE’s relationship with Israel – and the future of the Abraham Accords – under growing strain
The joint statement issued by the foreign ministers of eight Arab and Muslim countries was one of the clearest diplomatic signals of recent weeks. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates did more than condemn Israel’s E1 settlement project. They demanded that the plan be halted, the decisions approving it reversed, and sanctions considered against individuals and entities involved in settlement expansion. The signatories also reaffirmed that an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, remains the only viable path toward a lasting settlement, according to an official statement released by the UAE Foreign Ministry.
This was not just another communiqué intended to register concern over unfolding events. The reference to possible sanctions suggests that even the region’s more cautious governments are beginning to adopt a tougher stance. Israeli leaders apparently assume that normalization with certain Arab countries has become irreversible and that their objections can therefore be safely ignored. The E1 project, however, may reveal just how badly mistaken that calculation is.
The plan calls for the construction of more than 3,400 homes in the strategically important corridor between East Jerusalem and the Israeli settlement of Ma’ale Adumim. If implemented, it would effectively split the West Bank into northern and southern sections while cutting East Jerusalem off from the main territory of any future Palestinian state. In other words, E1 would reshape not only the demographic but also the political geography of the conflict. This is not a routine expansion of an existing settlement. It is a step that could deprive the “two states for two peoples” formula of its territorial foundation.
Israel’s far-right finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, has made no attempt to conceal the project’s political purpose, openly presenting it as a way to finally “bury” the idea of Palestinian statehood. E1 received final approval in 2025, and the publication of construction tenders in 2026 transformed it from a political threat into a plan moving toward practical implementation.
Against this backdrop, the UAE’s participation in the joint condemnation is especially significant. It was Abu Dhabi, after all, that was the leading Arab participant in the Abraham Accords in 2020 and the most persuasive example of normalization with Israel. The two countries opened embassies, lifted visa requirements, signed a free trade agreement, and began expanding cooperation in technology, energy, investment, and security. At first glance, then, the UAE’s decision to join other major Arab and Muslim powers in denouncing E1 may look like a sharp foreign-policy reversal.
It is still too early to suggest that Abu Dhabi is abandoning the Abraham Accords. Rather, the UAE is changing the terms on which it is prepared to support normalization and reminding Israel that establishing diplomatic relations did not amount to endorsing every subsequent action taken by the Israeli government. For the Emirates, normalization has always been an instrument of statecraft – not a commitment to follow Israel unconditionally.
The annexation of Palestinian territory is a matter of principle for the UAE leadership. In 2020, Abu Dhabi justified its decision to normalize relations by arguing that its agreement with Israel had halted the annexation of Palestinian land and preserved the possibility of a two-state solution. This was intended to reassure Arab audiences that the Emirates had not abandoned the Palestinian cause but had instead chosen a different way of influencing Israel: direct dialogue rather than a boycott. The latest demarche should therefore be seen not as a repudiation of that earlier policy, but as an attempt to restore the Abraham Accords to their originally stated purpose.
The Israeli government’s actions, however, are steadily making that argument harder to sustain. If normalization does not restrain annexation, halt settlement expansion, or preserve the prospect of Palestinian statehood, it becomes increasingly difficult for Abu Dhabi to explain what political purpose its special relationship with Israel actually serves.
As early as September 2025, UAE representative Lana Nusseibeh described the annexation of the West Bank as a “red line” that could destroy the spirit of the Abraham Accords. At the time, the Emirates reportedly considered downgrading diplomatic relations, although a complete break was not under discussion. The E1 project has now brought Israel dangerously close to that line.
There is also a broader strategic calculation at work. Israel is becoming politically toxic even for Arab governments that embraced normalization only a few years ago. The problem is not Israel’s existence or the need to maintain working relations with it. What has become toxic is the course pursued by the current Israeli government, which openly rejects Palestinian statehood, continues to expand settlements, and expects its Arab partners to quietly accept the new reality.
Put bluntly, the Israeli leadership has lost its sense of proportion. It behaves as though the economic and defense interests of Arab countries allow it to disregard their position on Palestine indefinitely. But there are limits to that approach. Israel cannot expect to deepen its relations with the Arab world while systematically destroying the possibility of a Palestinian state.
For the UAE, association with this policy carries growing reputational costs. Abu Dhabi has no intention of sacrificing its standing in the Arab and Muslim world to pay for the radicalism of members of the Israeli cabinet. The Emirates understand that, as the regional order is reshaped, they must maintain stable relations first and foremost with their neighbors and the leading powers of the Islamic world.
In the long run, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, and Jordan matter more to the UAE than unconditional solidarity with every policy adopted by Israel. Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia must also be considered, as their influence over the emerging Islamic political consensus continues to grow. Iran’s geopolitical clout is likewise visibly increasing following the end of the hot phase of the joint US-Israeli war against Tehran.
The presence of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan in this group is particularly important. Shortly before the statement was issued, the three countries formed the Mecca Defense Pact, which has already been described as a prototype for a “Muslim NATO.” The UAE did not join the alliance, and it would be wrong to portray it as a member. Yet the joint demarche over E1 shows that Abu Dhabi does not want to find itself outside the emerging Arab-Islamic political alignment. The Emirates are signaling that they can coordinate their position with the core members of the Mecca alliance while continuing to cooperate with Israel and the United States.
At the same time, the criticism of Israel was carefully calibrated. The eight countries cited not only international law and UN resolutions, but also Donald Trump’s peace plan and its rejection of West Bank annexation. This framed the Israeli government’s actions as a challenge not only to the demands of Arab countries but also to Washington’s own stated position. It allows the UAE to increase pressure on Israel without turning its demarche into an anti-American gesture.
For now, it is difficult to imagine Abu Dhabi opting for a complete break with Israel, although that possibility cannot be ruled out entirely. The cooperation built since the signing of the Abraham Accords has proved too valuable to the Emirates, particularly in the economic, technological, and security spheres.
A gradual cooling of relations is more likely. Official contacts may become less frequent, some joint projects could slow down, and statements from the Emirati leadership may grow increasingly blunt. If Israel continues pursuing the de facto annexation of Palestinian territory, however, Abu Dhabi may once again consider downgrading diplomatic ties.
At its core, the latest demarche is a warning, not a rupture. The UAE is making clear that normalization is not a blank check and does not give Israel the right to ignore the interests of the Arab world. The Israeli leadership has become far too confident that economic cooperation has permanently separated the Palestinian issue from its relations with Arab governments.
The E1 project proves otherwise. Normalization has political limits, and the Israeli government is moving dangerously close to crossing them.
