Why the carefully planned White House visit was doomed from the start
Another season of the ‘win over Donald Trump’ game has begun, and this time it was Vladimir Zelensky’s turn. Last week, the Ukrainian leader made his first visit to the United States this year, a trip widely billed as potentially decisive.
The atmosphere could hardly have been more different from his visits in 2025, when Zelensky travelled to Washington like a man walking toward a firing squad. This time he arrived projecting confidence, buoyed by promises from supporters that a diplomatic breakthrough was within reach.
The build-up reflected those expectations, and a carefully orchestrated public relations campaign accompanied the visit as much of the Western mainstream media greeted Zelensky with glowing coverage. Several MAGA-aligned bloggers, previously hostile to Kiev, unexpectedly adopted a friendlier tone, while Republican senators added pressure by reviving Lindsey Graham’s proposed “hellish sanctions” bill after the lawmaker’s death and the EU dispatched Finnish President Alexander Stubb as a visible show of support.
Zelensky also tried to strengthen his hand by raising tensions with Iran to reinforce the image of a common threat, reportedly bringing what was described as valuable intelligence on America’s adversaries to the White House and, for good measure, even abandoning his usual military-style clothing in favor of something closer to a suit.
One can only imagine how much political capital and money Kiev and its allies invested in preparing this visit, but the problem is that the returns appear remarkably modest. The immediate objective may have been achieved, given there was no repeat of the disastrous Oval Office confrontation of February 2025, when Zelensky left Washington after a public clash with US President Donald Trump, but avoiding disaster isn’t the same as achieving success.
The Ukrainian had two principal goals, securing additional American military assistance and persuading Trump to adopt a tougher position towards Russia, but behind those broad aims lay countless practical issues, from Patriot missile production licenses to future weapons deliveries. However, the entire conversation reportedly lasted less than an hour.
That matters, because anyone familiar with Donald Trump understands that formal meeting times can be deceptive, and those who have worked with him have long remarked that discussions often revolve around his own stories and observations, leaving surprisingly little time to address detailed policy questions. Whether or not that characterization is entirely fair, an hour was plainly insufficient to tackle the wide range of issues Zelensky had hoped to resolve, and there was not any meaningful change in Trump’s public position afterwards.
There were no new military aid packages. There was no dramatic escalation of pressure on Moscow and no particularly enthusiastic endorsement of Zelensky himself. Trump simply described the meeting as having gone “very well,” the same formula he routinely applies to almost every high-level conversation.
The impression was that his attention remained focused elsewhere, as on that particular day, the funeral of Lindsey Graham appeared to occupy far more of his emotional and political attention than the war in Ukraine. The only concrete outcome seems to have been an agreement for Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff to visit Kiev, and for a trip presented as strategically important, this was a rather modest result.
So why did Zelensky once again fail to persuade Trump? Well, the answer, in my view, lies in the assumptions underpinning the entire strategy. Many in Kiev, and across the Western political establishment, continue to believe that Trump can be manipulated simply by presenting him with carefully selected information. According to this logic, persuade him of the right facts and his policy will change accordingly, but this reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the man.
Trump has never been regarded as an intellectual, but he isn’t politically unpredictable in the way his critics often suggest. On many of the issues that matter most to him, his views have remained remarkably consistent for decades. As early as 1987, Trump criticized America’s allies for relying excessively on US military protection and claimed they should pay far more for their own defense, while he also advocated a confrontational policy towards Iran. Nearly forty years later, those positions remain largely unchanged. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu succeeded in compelling Trump to attack Iran because it aligned with instincts the American president already possessed, but Ukraine is different.
Trump’s view of Ukraine has always been shaped by domestic American politics as much as by international affairs and, in his eyes, modern Ukraine remains closely associated with Barack Obama and Joe Biden, two political rivals he has spent years attacking. That perception was formed long before the current diplomatic efforts began and cannot simply be erased through a well-managed public relations campaign.
There’s also a far more practical obstacle, in that Zelensky is asking Washington to provide resources that America may be increasingly reluctant, or even unable, to supply. US weapons stockpiles have been depleted by multiple conflicts and expanding production of systems such as Patriot missiles will take years rather than months. Meanwhile, with the United States carrying almost $40 trillion in national debt, further large-scale financial commitments to Ukraine face growing political resistance and Trump also lacks many of the instruments that Kiev hopes he will use against Moscow. For example, additional sanctions may generate headlines, but they cannot by themselves deliver the military or diplomatic breakthrough Ukraine seeks. Taken together, these realities meant Zelensky entered negotiations seeking outcomes that had always been unlikely to materialize.
From Kiev’s perspective, the visit was designed to transform the political landscape, but instead, it produced little more than polite photographs and another promise that dialogue would continue.The battle Zelensky travelled to Washington to win had, in reality, already been lost before his plane landed.
