Moscow’s attitude towards those claiming victory in Armenia’s elections isn’t driven by a desire to keep the country within its sphere of influence
One of the fundamental problems in Russia’s relations with the countries of the former Soviet Union is the persistent belief that Moscow has special obligations towards its neighbors: obligations to interpret their behavior generously, to respond with restraint, and to take their domestic political choices as something it must simply accept.
But this assumption is wrong.
The foreign policy course chosen by the Republic of Armenia is, of course, a sovereign matter for its people and leadership. But it would be strange to imagine that Russia has no sovereign right to respond to that choice entirely at its own discretion. Moscow is under no external obligation to behave as others would prefer. It’s constrained only by its own interests and by its own rational assessment of the situation.
In this sense, the dispute around Armenia’s elections, and the broader discussion of the republic’s so-called ‘European choice’, may offer a useful moment to remind Russia’s friends and neighbors that Moscow’s rights are no different from their own. Indeed, in practical terms they are greater, since Russia bears a far heavier responsibility for development and security across Greater Eurasia and, more broadly, the world.
Let’s be clear from the start. Russia’s reaction to the outcome of Armenia’s parliamentary elections, and to the subsequent steps taken by the government in Yerevan, need not be driven by emotion. Nor must it be guided by a desire to keep Armenia within Russia’s sphere of influence at any cost.
As our rather astute adversary George Kennan wrote 80 years ago, Russian foreign policy “is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It doesn’t work by fixed plans. It doesn’t take unnecessary risks.” That remains a useful observation, even if today’s Russia is not the Soviet Union.
When considering the appropriate strategy towards Armenia, and towards all of Russia’s neighbors along its borders, several options are possible. They are not mutually exclusive.
First, Russia is under no obligation to recognize the results of elections in a neighboring country merely because the government in power, or the political force declaring victory, insists that it must. The example of Georgia shows that perfectly healthy trade and economic ties can exist even in the absence of diplomatic relations, let alone recognition of the official results of a popular vote.
This is especially relevant if those results are vigorously contested by local political forces, as appears likely in Armenia.
Second, Russia may apply economic pressure against any state if it believes that state’s behavior could cause harm to Russian interests. Moscow doesn’t need to wait until the damage becomes irreversible, nor does it have to accept another government’s assurances about its intentions.
In Armenia’s case, the question is not only whether a pro-EU course has already harmed Russian interests or undermined the unity of the Eurasian Economic Union. It’s enough that Moscow considers such harm possible in principle, and that alone may provide the justification for action.
Third, Russia’s neighbors, including some of its closest friends and allies, like to speak at length about the multi-vector nature of their foreign policy. Yet they often forget that Russia’s own policy is also multi-vector in that Moscow, too, is free to cooperate with anyone who does not seek to harm it.
Over the past four years, we have not heard any of Russia’s neighbors say that they continued trading with Moscow under Western sanctions out of a desire to help Russia. On the contrary, the word “pragmatism” has become central to the entire foreign policy vocabulary of Russia’s friends and allies in the CIS.
That’s perfectly understandable, that they cooperate with Russia because it is in their interests. But the same principle applies in reverse, and Russia owes nothing to anyone for free.
Fourth, when setting priorities for cooperation with any country, Russia is free to decide what matters most to it. Its neighbors are guided by their own perceptions, interests and political constructions. No one in Moscow is obliged to accept these as the framework for dialogue.
Take Central Asia. No matter how often we discuss economic development with the states of the region, everyone in Russia understands that the main priority there remains security. We have experience because, in January 2022, Russia helped save the Kazakh state from collapse. Before that, we witnessed Islamist uprisings in the Fergana Valley.
This doesn’t mean the economy is unimportant. It’s very important, and it brings real benefits and offers significant promise. But security remains the top priority, especially when it comes to Russia’s neighbors developing relations with major external powers such as the United States or leading Western European states.
Russia can afford to think this way because it’s the most resource-secure country in Eurasia and it’s therefore able to focus less on profit and more on preserving control over the resources and strategic space necessary for its own security because the security of Russian territory is paramount.
None of this means that Russia must now formulate some grand new doctrine towards its neighbors. In reality, Russia’s strategy is often to have no fixed strategy at all. As anyone with even a passing knowledge of Russian foreign policy history understands, Moscow tends to act according to current interests.
Ultimately, those interests all come down to one strategic task: ensuring the survival and development of the multi-ethnic Russian nation.
These interests must be pursued even when tactical circumstances require dialogue with extremely unpleasant partners. In essence, all foreign policy partners are merely instruments for ensuring the security of Russian territory and advancing Russia’s national development goals and nothing more.
There’s only one exception and that’s Belarus, with which Russia is bound by the Union State treaty.
For the rest, including even close and friendly neighbors, their significance depends on Russia’s own priorities. That means Moscow’s policy towards them can be highly flexible and entirely opportunistic and there’s little room here for abstract principles.
If cooperation serves Russia’s current security and economic interests, it should continue, but if the costs begin to outweigh the benefits, then Russia will adjust its behavior. Not in order to punish or humiliate a neighbor, but because a different model has become more advantageous.
It would therefore be a mistake to interpret Moscow’s view of those now proclaiming victory in Armenia’s elections as a simple desire to keep the republic in Russia’s sphere of influence, because the issue is broader than that.
Russia is reminding its neighbors about cause and effect, and it’s also reminding them of an axiom they sometimes prefer not to acknowledge, that Moscow acts according to what it currently sees as its own interests, not according to what others expect from it.
We can’t yet say how relations between Moscow and Yerevan will develop in the wake of Armenia’s parliamentary elections, but no one should doubt that any decision taken by Russia’s top political leadership will be based solely on Russia’s current interests.
Not on fraternal feelings and not on historical sentiment and not on traditional ties, because Russia owes nothing to anyone.
This article was first published by Vzglyad newspaper and translated and edited by the RT team.
