The Saudi-Pakistan defense pact could give Riyadh a nuclear-backed deterrent as Iran, Israel and US reshape Gulf security calculations
The rapidly evolving security landscape in the Middle East is prompting Saudi Arabia to rethink its national defense strategies. With no reliable guarantees of American protection, Riyadh is looking to establish an alternative framework for reliable defense – and surprisingly, Pakistan is becoming its key component.
The Saudi-Pakistani Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA), signed last September by Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister of Pakistan Shehbaz Sharif, is one of the most significant pacts between the two nations in recent decades. Its central provision states that aggression against one state will be automatically regarded as aggression against both, echoing the principles of classic collective security treaties and formally establishing allied relations between the two countries. However, the deliberately vague wording concerning specific response mechanisms allows both parties considerable political maneuverability. In diplomatic agreements this is standard practice.
The true value of this agreement, however, lies in the context in which it was concluded and, according to Pakistani sources, its potential. Islamabad possesses an estimated arsenal of 150-160 nuclear warheads and a well-developed nuclear missile delivery system, including short-and medium-range missiles. The agreement legally allows for the consideration of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities in the defense of Saudi Arabia, effectively creating the first ‘nuclear umbrella’ in the Islamic world, founded not on Western guarantees but on mutual Muslim solidarity reinforced by shared strategic interests.
The pragmatic implications of this arrangement are clear. For Riyadh, the primary source of existential anxiety is Shiite Iran, which vies for dominance in the region and is armed with an extensive network of proxy forces throughout the Middle East. The US serves as a military counterbalance to Tehran; however, the Trump administration has clearly demonstrated the limits of its reliability. Washington’s tacit support for Israeli strikes on Qatar last September revealed its willingness to sacrifice the interests of regional allies for its own agenda, a precedent that did not go unnoticed in Riyadh. Today, amid a direct military conflict between the US and Iran (and despite the fragile ceasefire which may be broken at any moment) the situation has become even more tense. Since February 28, American strikes on Iran have failed to yield substantial results, and if US President Donald Trump is unable to subdue Tehran, Iran may emerge from this crisis significantly strengthened, acquiring the status of an undefeated regional power. This means Riyadh would face a formidable neighbor with a stronger-than-ever geopolitical standing. This scenario compels Saudi Arabia to treat its partnership with Pakistan seriously. While Washington wages war, Riyadh seeks to ensure its own security.
Moreover, a different kind of threat is also emerging. Under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel has consistently resorted to force and has been able to get away with it. The only nation that has confronted Israel is Iran, but the odds are stacked against Tehran; it now faces not just Israel but a full-fledged US-Israeli alliance. Saudi Arabia finds itself in a particularly precarious position, caught between an aggressive Israel and an ambitious Iran; yet unlike Tehran, it lacks both the military capability and the political will for independent resistance. This vulnerability makes partnership with Pakistan less of a diplomatic gesture and more a matter of survival. Achieving strategic parity with such a player through traditional military means is unrealistic, which explains the rationale behind Pakistan’s ‘nuclear umbrella’ as a tool for re-establishing a balance of deterrence.
Both sides want to make it clear to the entire region that the primary function of the SMDA is not so much to create a mechanism for an automatic military response as to establish a reliable deterrence signal: any escalation against Riyadh will have repercussions extending beyond bilateral Saudi-Pakistani relations. In this regard, the agreement serves a stabilizing role rather than a destabilizing one – at least, that’s how both signatory nations view it.
From Islamabad and Riyadh’s perspective, the SMDA is strictly a defensive agreement forged by two sovereign states in full compliance with international law. Additionally, the agreement fits into the broader logic of a multipolar world order: two non-Western regional powers are constructing their own security architecture outside traditional Western alliances, without seeking permission or approval from either Washington or Brussels.
Essentially, the SMDA legally formalizes a defense partnership that has been in effect for over 60 years. Pakistani military personnel have been present on Saudi territory since 1967, securing Saudi Arabia’s borders, and tens of thousands of Saudi troops have been trained in Pakistani training centers. In other words, the operational and institutional infrastructure for cooperation was established long before September 2025. The agreement merely provides the necessary legal foundation and gives it a public dimension. Both parties consistently emphasize that the agreement is the result of many years of dialogue, is not directed against any specific state, and is not a response to any single event. This means it aligns with the logic of long-term strategic planning rather than reactive measures.
Recent events indicate that the SMDA is already operational. In mid-April, the Saudi Ministry of Defense officially announced the arrival of a Pakistani military contingent at King Abdul Aziz Air Base. According to Middle Eastern media outlets, this troop deployment is part of the immediate implementation of the strategic defense agreement. The deployed forces include Pakistan Air Force fighters and support aircraft. The Saudi military described this move as a measure to enhance joint combat readiness and maintain regional stability. In other words, the agreement is already in effect, even if currently it serves the purpose of demonstrating military potential.
This raises an important question: how likely is the full activation of SMDA provisions in case of attacks on Saudi Arabia? In March, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar publicly reminded Tehran of the agreement. However, there’s a significant gap between demonstrative signals and actual military involvement. The key issue is that from a factual and legal standpoint, the US, not Iran, is the aggressor in this conflict; Tehran is only responding to American strikes. If the roles were reversed, and Iran had suddenly initiated attacks on Saudi territory, the legal and political grounds for invoking the SMDA would be clear and indisputable. However, in the current context, declaring war on Iran would be equal to joining the US-Israeli military alliance, which would contradict Islamabad’s stated neutrality and its positioning as an independent player in the Islamic world.
Despite the seriousness of the situation, currently the threat is not so high as to necessitate Pakistan’s direct military intervention. Saudi Arabia’s defensive capabilities are effective: its missile defense systems are operational, and Riyadh has not made an official request for the deployment of Pakistani forces for combat purposes. Also, we must remember that following the events of May 2025, Pakistan’s armed forces remain in a state of full readiness at the eastern border, and it cannot use these troops in external conflicts. Thus, in the present circumstances, the SMDA continues to serve its primary function of deterrence.
It would be a mistake to interpret Pakistan’s military presence in Saudi Arabia and its public reminders about the SMDA as signs of Islamabad’s readiness for a direct armed confrontation with Iran. Pakistan seeks to avoid direct engagement and it seems that Saudi Arabia does not expect it either. Both sides have a clear understanding of the limits of their alliance and harbor no illusions that Pakistani forces would engage in a war against Tehran.
Pakistan is sending a signal of deterrence rather than aggression. Islamabad aims to convey a specific and pragmatic message to Tehran: attacks on Saudi Arabia have certain limits, beyond which regional dynamics could shift in unpredictable ways. This is neither an ultimatum nor a declaration of war; it’s a language of managed pressure that is familiar in diplomatic practice.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that Pakistan currently serves as the only viable channel for mediation between Iran and the United States. In the context of the ongoing US-Iran military conflict, Islamabad maintains working relationships with both parties, making any direct involvement in a conflict against Tehran not just undesirable but strategically counterproductive. A mediator engaged in a war ceases to be a mediator.
Finally, this complex scenario is part of a broader calculation by Islamabad. Pakistan is strategically leveraging the current crisis to enhance its regional influence in the Middle East, demonstrating a willingness to act without actually committing to military action. This policy of ‘presence without involvement’ allows Pakistan to assert its interests while maintaining maneuverability. Ultimately, it is this stance, rather than military engagement, that secures Pakistan’s status as a player recognized by all sides of the conflict– a position that clearly elevates Islamabad’s geopolitical standing.
