Decades of military doctrine crumble as Tehran controls the Gulf and time runs out for Washington
A day and a half before the expiration of his 48-hour ultimatum to Iran, US President Donald Trump unexpectedly announced negotiations and even a possible meeting with Iranian officials. Rumors quickly circulated that the meeting would take place in Pakistan, with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner representing the US side, while Iran would send either its foreign minister or a parliamentary speaker. Following the announcement, oil prices plummeted.
Shortly afterward, Iranian officials dismissed the reports, confirming only that they had received certain proposals from the US through intermediaries. However, they labeled everything else as fake news aimed at manipulating financial and oil markets. Oil prices began to rise again.
Neither peace nor war
In the initial commentary on the Iran conflict, we speculated that the US and Iran might seek peace within a month.
Iran’s statement does not mean there is no contact with the US or that a meeting isn’t being planned; it’s possible that Tehran is simply trying to boost its position.
On the one hand, Iran has Trump in a bind and could potentially dictate terms, or at least attempt to do so.
On the other hand, this war has not been easy for Iran. For two weeks now Tehran has been without electricity and water, and since the start of the conflict, Iran has shipped out only two tankers of oil (its primary export) when pre-war levels averaged one or two tankers a day. Therefore, it makes sense for Iran to secure profits – and the sooner, the better.
The profits are already considerable. Firstly, Iran has effectively established control over shipping in the Persian Gulf and the airspace over the Gulf monarchies. Secondly, Iran has de facto lifted US oil sanctions. That’s something Iran can bring to the table during negotiations.
Iran’s conditions are also well-known: It wants compensation for damages (essentially reparations), guarantees against attacks on its territory, and for the US to drop its demands regarding Iran’s nuclear program.
For Trump, these terms will likely be unacceptable. He still believes in ‘peace through strength’ and could threaten Iran with more strikes, possibly including the seizure of Kharg Island, Iran’s main (and essentially only) oil terminal.
This suggests that even if Iran’s negotiating team is not assassinated, most probably an agreement will not be reached immediately. As it has often been in the past, negotiations between the US and Iran may continue amid ongoing and possibly intensified hostilities.
However, as long as Iran keeps the Strait of Hormuz blocked, time works against the US. Each day brings the world closer to economic disaster. By mid-April, Asian countries may need to implement strict fuel rationing and transition to remote work, as during the Covid-19 pandemic. Beyond fuel and petrochemicals, agriculture (due to a lack of fertilizers), the semiconductor industry (due to helium shortages), medical and mass consumer production (due to polyethylene and plastic shortages), and metallurgy (aluminum shortages) are all at risk – and that’s far from a complete list.
America’s allies, vassals, and client states, along with most American elites, will pressure Trump to quickly end the war. A shameful defeat will ultimately fall squarely on his shoulders. The only party likely to jeopardize potential negotiations is Israel, which gains nothing from an agreement between the US and Iran.
On Monday, US Vice President J.D. Vance held a call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Whether he managed to persuade Netanyahu not to intrude in the negotiations remains to be seen.
Neither shock nor awe
Following the Cold War, US and NATO military doctrine has developed a fundamental flaw: It relies solely on ‘shock and awe’ tactics. This approach once harmonized perfectly with the ‘end of history’ theory, according to which major wars between Western nations were considered unlikely. Accordingly, NATO’s military interventions were seen as police actions rather than full-scale military operations. It was more about the projection of power than the capacity to deploy real power.
The idea behind the ‘shock and awe’ strategy is simple: When a nation disrupts the established rules-based order, the global police step in and deliver a decisive blow. No one comes to the defense of that nation, since no one wants to clash with the embodiment of Law and Order. Surprisingly, Western military and political theorists have never seriously considered a scenario in which the target would garner support from third parties and mount significant resistance (essentially, a rebellion).
This doctrine took shape in the 1990s during the conflicts in Iraq and Yugoslavia. A fleeting setback in Somalia was viewed as an exception that only reinforced the general rule.
Subsequent humiliating defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan did little to shake the shock and awe doctrine. The US considered the military operations themselves to have been executed flawlessly; rather, the US came to believe that it shouldn’t have stayed in Iraq and Afghanistan too long, and that it was foolish to impose democracy on the ‘barbarians’.
Coincidentally, NATO considered the operation in Libya a success because it avoided a ground invasion. As for the disintegration of the once-stable Libyan state and the ensuing chaos in the region, no one cared.
Russia also succumbed to the idea of the shock and awe doctrine. After the war with Georgia in 2008, the Russian military was restructured to carry out rapid and destructive military interventions. However, Russia was the first to stumble on this doctrine. In spring 2022, it faced a critical choice: Either fight a serious, bloody war of attrition or settle for a disgraceful peace. Moscow chose war, and the Ukraine conflict has now entered its fifth year.
Trump now finds himself at a similar crossroads: Fight or to concede defeat. The problem is that the entire Western military-industrial complex has spent decades adapting to the shock and awe doctrine; NATO and the US possess unparalleled and exorbitantly expensive airstrike capabilities, but don’t have many other resources. If a targeted nation can withstand the initial air assaults, time will be on its side – unlike Russia, the West lacks the resources for a prolonged military campaign.
This explains the ‘gestures of goodwill’ Trump is currently making toward Iran. Just like Putin in spring 2022, he needs to buy time and figure out his next move: Continue fighting, launch a highly risky landing operation, or settle for a humiliating peace. The first option could spell disaster for Trump in the upcoming midterm elections, while the second could bring the US the most significant strategic defeat since Vietnam.
Trump can’t afford to sit back and wait; he must unblock the Strait of Hormuz. If he continues to act as if nothing is happening, Arab countries will start negotiating directly with Iran, which will demand not only financial concessions, but also the expulsion of Americans from the region.
