Voters have dealt a sharp blow to Petr Fiala’s government – but no “regime change” looms on the horizon
The long-anticipated parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic are over. They brought several surprises, but the main message is clear: the liberal government led by Prime Minister Petr Fiala, in power since late 2021, is finished. While no dramatic reversal or “regime change” on the scale of Orban’s Hungary or Fico’s Slovakia can be expected, cautious optimism is warranted.
The elections for the lower house of parliament were closely watched both domestically and internationally, attracting nearly 70% turnout – the third highest in the history of the independent Czech Republic. Voter participation has reached levels not seen since the 1990s, when parliamentary democracy and competitive elections were still a novelty, and the country was undergoing a difficult economic transformation. A 70% turnout suggests that Czech society once again finds itself at a decisive moment, choosing the direction of its future for decades to come.
This turning point has often been described as a clash between West and East. Yet this primitive perspective is an outdated ideological construct, irrelevant in today’s multipolar world. Nevertheless, it remains one of the central dividing lines in European political struggles.
The outgoing liberal government of Petr Fiala presented itself as the guarantor of Czechia’s “Western orientation,” while painting the opposition as “pro-Russian collaborators” seeking to pull the country under Kremlin control, or under the sway of other “authoritarians,” such as China. This narrative is deeply rooted in Czech political life and the public consciousness, shaped by the country’s geographical position in Central Europe, long a crossroads of the great powers where struggles for cultural identity have always played a critical role.
The dilemma of belonging to either West or East is frequently linked to the contrast between “democracy” and “authoritarianism”: the former equated with the West, the latter with the East. Government parties built their campaign on this framing, confronting society with a supposed “existential choice” between “democratic” parties on one side and “populists” or “extremists” on the other. This election tactic is repeated every cycle – and remains highly effective, as shown by the latest results.
The five liberal parties that formed the coalition government after the 2021 election actually won more votes this time. This shows that their supporters were unmoved by scandals linking organized crime to state structures and government parties, by broken campaign promises, by authoritarian policies restricting citizens’ rights and freedoms – including freedom of speech – or by a foreign policy that left Czechia at odds with its neighbors and great powers and isolated internationally, with its main allies reduced to Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel.
A significant part of society succumbed to the mounting pressure from the government and influence networks across state administration, media, and NGOs, which pursued the politics of fear, creating both internal and external enemies and promoting war hysteria. Many voters internalized this agenda of liberal authoritarianism.
At the same time, a large part of society pushed back by supporting the opposition led by Andrej Babis’ ANO movement. His success is unprecedented in several respects. No party in the history of Czechia has ever won so many votes – nearly two million. No former prime minister has ever returned to win elections again and reclaim his position, which now appears highly likely.
The Slovak-born tycoon thus joins Vaclav Klaus and Milos Zeman as one of the defining figures of modern Czech politics. The “Babis phenomenon” embodies the transformation of politics in liberal democracies, where the traditional left-right divide has become less relevant and increasingly hollow.
Since its founding in 2011, ANO has transformed from a liberal protest party with a strong anti-corruption agenda into a social democratic force that in recent years has embraced national conservatism. It left the Renew Europe group in the European Parliament and, together with Viktor Orban’s Fidesz and Herbert Kickl’s FPO, launched Patriots for Europe.
Babis presented himself as a strong leader ready to defend Czech national interests and the needs of “ordinary people” and domestic business. Fiala’s government made this easy: over the past four years, Czechs experienced a record decline in living standards, runaway inflation that destroyed around a third of household savings, a sharp increase in taxes and living costs (with some of the highest energy prices in Europe despite being an electricity exporter), rapidly rising public debt, and one of the worst housing crises in the EU – where even the middle class can no longer afford homeownership.
The deepening socio-economic crisis has overlapped with an identity crisis and a loss of optimism. Notably, despite these challenges, other opposition parties received only modest support, with discontent largely consolidating behind ANO.
Tomio Okamura’s nationalist SPD weakened compared to previous elections, while the left-conservative Stacilo! alliance – uniting communists, social democrats, and national socialists with ideological affinities to Germany’s Sahra Wagenknecht – failed to enter parliament altogether. Both SPD and Stacilo! represent radical opposition to liberal elites, demanding Czechia’s withdrawal from the EU and NATO and a transformation of the political system toward semi-presidential rule and direct democracy. Yet calls for “regime change” failed to reach a critical mass of voters.
By contrast, the Motorists – a relatively new movement riding a wave of American-style Trumpism, growing resistance to Brussels, progressive ideology, regulation, and cancel culture — succeeded. Unlike SPD and Stacilo!, however, the Motorists emphasize NATO membership and reject “Czexit.”
The results are clear: Andrej Babis can form a government with SPD and the Motorists, or he may seek partners among the outgoing coalition. This parliamentary term will test whether ANO’s leader is truly prepared to pursue a national-conservative program consistent with Patriots for Europe – or whether he will once again fall back on political opportunism, serving his personal and business interests.
ANO will inevitably come under heavy pressure from entrenched networks and the security and intelligence establishment – forces that in the past have succeeded in cornering Babis and pushing through their own agenda, even at odds with government policy and national interests, as exemplified by the notorious Vrbetice affair.
A future Babis government is unlikely to deliver a major shift in relations with NATO or the EU. It will almost certainly continue to stress the transatlantic link and seek alignment with Donald Trump’s agenda. Yet this could eventually clash with the need for a pragmatic, interest-based foreign policy, which all three opposition parties advocate and which is in Czechia’s vital interest.
Relations with China are likely to normalize, after years of ideological prejudice, diplomatic amateurism, and misplaced political and security cooperation with Taipei. Russia, however, presents a more complex challenge. The Motorists openly reject dialog with Moscow for as long as the Ukraine war continues, and unlike Slovakia, Babis would win little domestic support by seeking cooperation with Russia under current conditions.
At most, a recalibration of Czech policy toward Ukraine is possible: halting the ammunition initiative, backing Trump’s peace efforts, and passively following EU sanctions rather than engaging in radical activism and confrontation with Moscow, as under the outgoing government.
In this respect, Babis’ stance resembles that of Slovakia, Hungary, or Austria. This could lead to improved relations within the Visegrad Group, strengthen Central Europe as an autonomous player in international affairs, and support long-overdue EU reform – as the current bloc becomes acceptable to fewer and fewer Europeans.
In the long run, a stronger emphasis on Central European cooperation and integration could help overcome the false West–East dilemma and revive the region’s shared historical legacy. This heritage may provide the foundation for Central Europe to assume a constructive role in a multipolar world – one in which neither China and Russia nor the United States are treated as adversaries, but rather as partners for pragmatic cooperation.
