Beijing’s close ties with Islamabad give it a level of influence over dealings with Delhi
The recent terrorist attack in India’s Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, which originated in Pakistan and resulted in the death of 26, mostly Hindu, civilians, has triggered another wave of heightened tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad.
While public discourse has focused on terrorism and hostilities between the two nuclear-powered nations, a deeper analysis reveals the unmistakable imprint of another key actor – China’s strategic calculus in the region.
The relationship between Islamabad and New Delhi has evolved significantly in recent decades. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar travelled to Beijing days after the military standoff with Delhi and met his counterpart Wang Yi. The Chinese Foreign Minister called Pakistan an ”iron-clad friend” and ”all-weather strategic partner.”
China is pursuing a strategy that aligns with its regional interests — including economic engagement, defense cooperation, and influence-building. This strategy, logically, includes efforts to slow down India’s rise.
Pahalgam incident thus cannot be seen an isolated terrorist attack, but as a signal within a larger geostrategic landscape that is shaping Asia’s future.
Strategic Timing
The flareup in South Asia has come at a time of major geopolitical developments. With the mass shift of Western companies like Apple away from China to India, India is poised to become the next big manufacturing hub.
As global businesses explore alternatives to rising operational costs and geopolitical uncertainties in China, India is increasingly seen as a competitive option. Additionally, the proposed US tariffs may add pressure to China’s manufacturing sector, which is already adapting to evolving global supply chains. For the strongman leader, Xi Jinping, sustaining economic growth and employment remains a top priority.
Any escalation involving India could introduce uncertainty that might affect investor sentiment and infrastructure momentum. Regional instability could redirect global attention away from India’s growth narrative toward internal and border-related concerns. China’s close political, economic and defence ties with Pakistan – an economically vulnerable partner – gives Beijing a certain level of influence on the way Islamabad deals with India.
New Delhi was compelled to act militarily, risking escalation and economic fallout. To India’s credit, it managed to negotiate a ceasefire after achieving its key objectives of affecting 11 Pakistani air bases and nine terrorist camps and other strategic terrorist infrastructures against the popular sentiment against de-escalation.
Economic factor
Pakistan has been struggling with near to bankruptcy. Its foreign exchange reserves have fallen to $4.3bn, its lowest levels since February 2014. Despite a $2.4 billion bailout from the IMF – approved on May 9, when Islamabad and New Delhi were firing missiles at each other – the Pakistani economy is still in tatters. China’s offer of financial and military aid to Islamabad at such times comes in more than handy.
China’s support for Pakistan is not circumstantial. It is also institutional and deeply entrenched. Between 2014 to 2024, China sold over $9 billion worth of advanced weaponry to Pakistan, accounting for around 80% of imported weapons, including J-10CE fighter jets, Wing Loong drones, LY-80 air defence systems, and naval assets. The operational use of these systems in the recent conflict, including Pakistani claims of downing Rafales using Chinese PL-15 missiles, has allowed Beijing to showcase its weapons systems in live combat.
Beyond India, China’s motivation also ties into its long-term strategic objectives in the Persian Gulf. Pakistan provides China access to the Arabian Sea via Gwadar port, a linchpin in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and part of the broader Belt and Road Initiative. This maritime access offers China two significant advantages: a strategic military presence near key Middle Eastern shipping lanes and an alternative route for oil imports in case of a US-China maritime standoff in the South China Sea.
Military-Industrial Complex benefits
China’s defence industry is another big beneficiary of the escalation. Claims by the Pakistan Air Force that Chinese-made jets outmanoeuvred India’s French-built Rafales, regardless of their authenticity, have created a nationalist fervour in Chinese social media and boosted investor confidence. Stocks in Chinese defence manufacturers surged as hashtags like “J-10 shot down Indian warplanes” trended online, and praise for the PL-15 missile system flooded Weibo.
Indeed, Beijing wants to use this as an inflexion point for its arms export ambitions. With Western suppliers often constrained by political alignments or human rights concerns, China’s relatively unrestricted military exports offer an attractive alternative, especially in conflict-prone or authoritarian regimes across Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia. A perceived successful battlefield performance strengthens China’s pitch as a reliable arms supplier.
From shaping regional dynamics to advancing its defense exports and maintaining strategic interests in West Asia, China may perceive certain advantages in the current situation in the region. While the Pahalgam attack was carried out by terrorist actors, it may also reflect broader regional undercurrents in which multiple stakeholders play complex and calculated roles.
Through India-Pakistan rivalry, China is executing a proxy strategy that would halt India’s rise, safeguard its own economic interests and bolster its defence exports and regional clout. Beijing has much to gain and little to lose from this rivalry — as long as it stays just below the threshold of full-scale war.
