New Delhi’s role as a counterweight to China solidifies its status as Washington’s’ key partner in South Asia, outweighing short-term concerns over Russian oil revenues
The year 2025 had barely started when the outgoing Joe Biden administration presented a belated ‘holiday gift’ to Russian oil exporters. Washington announced a new sanctions package – the “most significant” yet, according to US officials.
This time, it affected Russian oil giants Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegaz. These companies already face restrictions on access to American financing and technology, but now it seems that the US and UK are about to impose more severe sanctions on the Russian oil giants.
The sanctions target 183 vessels – primarily the so-called “shadow fleet” tankers that transport Russian oil – as well as support vessels. According to US estimates, these vessels carry about one-third of Russia’s oil exports, and this move is intended to suffocate Russian oil producers. While this will likely trigger a surge in oil prices, US and EU authorities believe they can hold out until prices stabilize and decline.
India, one of the key purchasers of Russian oil, swiftly responded to the announcement. A senior Indian official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Bloomberg that state-owned refineries will no longer process oil brought in by sanctioned tankers. They are negotiating with alternative suppliers from the Middle East and considering other strategies to avoid secondary US sanctions.
This situation is certainly concerning, but how critical is it?
Indian politicians often use Bloomberg as a means of conveying their intentions to overseas partners. Right after the price cap on Russian oil was implemented, Bloomberg quoted another high-ranking Indian official who claimed that although India wouldn’t officially join the “price cap,” it would unofficially adhere to the restrictions.
The current sanctions package demonstrated that there wasn’t much truth behind those words: tankers from the “shadow fleet” were sanctioned precisely because they transported oil purchased in violation of the price cap. It appears that India is sending a similar message this time, attempting to reassure the US – at least until US President Donald Trump’s new administration clarifies its stance on sanctions and in general on relations with Russia.
New Delhi and Moscow have plenty of ways to navigate around sanctions. The very concept of a “shadow fleet” allows for significant flexibility when it comes to flags, ownership of vessels, and operators (and sometimes even the use of AIS transponders). Moreover, India has a number of private oil refineries, and there are serious doubts about whether the US will actually impose sanctions on both government-owned Indian companies and the oil tycoons closely aligned with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
The main concern isn’t even the potential spike in oil prices for European consumers – the stability of European economies isn’t exactly a top concern for the US. In the eyes of the Washington elites, India remains the most valuable partner in South Asia, as its mere existence complicates China’s economic and political expansion. Therefore, the Americans are unlikely to risk their relationship with New Delhi just to temporarily reduce Moscow’s oil revenue.
The real question is how long India is willing to keep circumventing these sanctions. After the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict, New Delhi faced intense pressure from the US and EU, which urged it to align with other Western democracies, condemn Russia, and cut off all cooperation with it.
At that time, Indian diplomats managed to deftly navigate these pressures – largely because neither the Americans nor the Europeans were ready to sever ties with such an important partner – and waited for tempers in the West to cool down and politicians to realize that India’s neutral stance, along with that of some other countries, helps the global economy function as a unified system, even if it comes with certain challenges. This position allowed India to secure a steady supply of inexpensive petroleum products and a modest flow of technology and investments from Russia.
However, recently, New Delhi has increasingly signaled its willingness to act as a peacemaker. Under these circumstances, India’s stance on sanctions may eventually change.
This article was first published by the magazine Profile and was translated and edited by the RT team
