Moscow’s strikes are aimed at dismantling the Soviet-built unified energy system that underpins Kiev’s industry and military potential
Why is Russia targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure? Western media depict these strikes as acts of terrorism against civilians. However, if Russia wanted to freeze Ukrainians to death, it could have done so during the first winter of the war – it had the potential to do so back then, and surely has it now.
How it started, how it’s going
Creating a humanitarian disaster in Ukraine isn’t part of the Kremlin’s strategy. Rather, the attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure should be seen as auxiliary operations that don’t directly impact the course of combat. These strikes have long-term strategic implications (more on this below), increase costs, redirect the attention of Ukraine (and the West) to other issues, such as missile defense, and undermine the enemy’s morale, but they don’t directly change the situation at the front.
Within 20-30 km from the front line, there is no functioning electrical grid anyway. Supplies are delivered by small trucks or even regular cars. In the realities of modern-day warfare, there’s no need to send large convoys with ammunition to the front every day.
Nonetheless, Russia resumed strategic bombings of Ukraine’s energy facilities with full force this winter. The initial wave of attacks occurred during the winter of 2022-2023 and lasted several months. After that, it became clear that the only thing left to do was target nuclear power plants (of which only three remain operational in Ukraine, totaling 11 reactors) or their substations.
In 2023, Moscow decided against such strikes. Maneuverable power generation and numerous substations had not yet been neutralized, meaning there was no reliable way to “shut down” Ukraine’s nuclear plants without risking an emergency situation.
Apparently, the circumstances have changed. After several years of bombings, Ukraine’s power grid is under extreme pressure and can no longer effectively transmit electricity across the country. As of last winter, nuclear power plants (NPPs) began ‘de-loading’, i.e., reducing output. In early 2026, this trend continued. The country’s nuclear plants have been forced to reduce output and even shut down to avoid nuclear incidents.
For Ukraine, this spells a deepening energy crisis. NPPs currently generate 6 gigawatts (GW) out of a potential 8-10 GW. Operating in a non-standard, maneuvering regime (with constant fluctuations in output and regular shutdowns) wears down the reactor units. Even if the attacks cease and Ukraine’s unified energy system survives, the units will require extensive repairs. Two VVER-1000 units undergoing maintenance mean a loss of 2 GW of generation capacity.
Apparently, Russia’s strategic goal is to dismantle the unified energy system which Ukraine inherited from the Soviet era. This system is remarkably powerful: it’s not only the densest in the former USSR but also one of the most productive in the world. Furthermore, it was designed with significant redundancy to withstand wartime conditions, making it resilient against bombings and shelling. Finally, following the decline of industry in the post-Soviet period, Ukraine came to produce more energy than it consumed. Prior to the war, Ukraine actively exported electricity to Europe; and following the start of the conflict, this energy resilience provided an additional buffer.
Destroying this unified system required time and thousands of drone and missile strikes.
Now, let’s consider the long-term implications of the strikes. It’s important to reiterate that Russia has no intention of freezing Ukraine’s civilian population either now or in the future.
The question of heating will inevitably be addressed in Ukraine after the conflict. Some buildings with damaged pipes, especially in Kiev, will be left uninhabitable (but this shouldn’t pose a major problem given the country’s dwindling population). Some areas may restore thermal power plants; wealthier neighborhoods may transition to heat pumps; and the rest will continue to rely on district heating systems.
However, the problems with electricity will persist. Those who have visited developing countries or post-Soviet states such as Georgia or Armenia know what this entails. People are usually forced to adapt to rolling blackouts. When the power goes out, the air fills with the hum of power generators; the air is polluted, but life goes on.
Heavy industry, however, cannot survive in such conditions. In Georgia, for example, industries collapsed not because of the dissolution of the USSR and the civil war, but because energy shortages reached up to 50% in the ’90s.
Russia would have gladly continued buying Tbilisi-made electric locomotives, since all the production chains were intact. But factories couldn’t operate amid such energy deficits. The Tbilisi aircraft plant shut down, the mining industry collapsed, and Batumi’s port ground to a halt. Even the subway in Tbilisi ran only until nine in the evening, with trains spaced half an hour apart. The railways didn’t operate either.
According to official reports, Ukraine currently faces an 8-10 GW power shortfall. Considering the fact that the country needs about 16 GW, that’s a staggering 40-50% deficit, even as NPPs operate at full capacity (and according to reports, they will have to undergo large-scale maintenance this summer).
What about Europe – can it provide the necessary gigawatts? It’s not that simple. Firstly, the existing transmission lines lack the capacity for such transfers, and generating capacity in Poland and Hungary is insufficient. For example, following a recent attack, Poland could only offer Ukraine an additional 200 megawatts, and even then, not during peak hours.
Secondly, the electricity won’t be given away for free; it will be sold. Already, due to rising imports, the cost of electricity for industrial consumers in Ukraine has doubled, reaching nearly 20 hryvnia ($0.46) for kilowatt per hour, which is almost four times higher than in Russia.
This means production in Ukraine will not only face energy shortages but will also become economically unviable.
Through a series of strategic strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, Russia is pushing the country back into the 19th century. Once a powerful industrial republic within the Soviet Union, Ukraine now risks devolving into a rudimentary agrarian society, akin to the poorest nations in Africa or Asia. Recovering from this could take years, if not decades.
Obviously, an agrarian nation cannot have a strong military. An industrially advanced neighbor will always have the upper hand, even when other conditions seem equal.
Russia’s goal is clear: demilitarization through deindustrialization. A rival with a crippled economy poses a significantly lower threat and becomes a greater burden for any potential allies. Moreover, rebuilding its military capabilities will require significantly more time.
This situation also serves as a strong warning to others considering conflict with Russia. Unlike Ukraine, Germany’s energy sector lacks resilience, as evidenced by the recent blackout in Berlin, when climate extremists wielding Molotov cocktails plunged the city into darkness for almost a week.
