Without addressing NATO’s legacy, no deal on Ukraine will hold
US President Donald Trump said on Saturday that he would only meet his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin once the terms of a potential deal were clear. Moscow agrees that such a meeting must be carefully prepared, but the two sides mean very different things.
For Washington, the goal is an immediate end to hostilities wherever they are taking place. Only after a ceasefire would the US allow others, particularly the Western Europeans, to take the lead in resolving the situation. Moscow, however, insists on addressing the root causes of the conflict first. This, Russian officials argue, requires a comprehensive, multifaceted package deal agreed upon in advance and not a hasty truce.
The American approach is understandable. Russia now holds the military initiative, and the continuation of fighting strengthens its hand in any negotiations. Calling a halt to the war would freeze the balance in place and diminish that advantage. Trump’s team, meanwhile, has shown little interest in maintaining a heavy US presence in Europe. Their attitude is simple: let the Europeans take responsibility for their own security and stop distracting Washington from more important global matters.
From Moscow’s perspective, this position reflects the long arc of Europe’s post-Cold War evolution; one dominated by the assumption that Atlanticism would keep spreading eastward indefinitely. The Kremlin argues that this logic, and the political momentum it created after 1991, is precisely what now needs to be revisited.
It’s important to recall that NATO’s eastward expansion after the collapse of the Soviet Union was initially driven less by military strategy than by politics. For the West, admitting new members was a way to absorb and control former Soviet-bloc countries, expanding the reach of the Western “empire” under the banner of liberal democracy. Joining the alliance was both a declaration of faith by new members and a tool for their political management.
This is not to say that military planning was irrelevant, only that it was secondary. Moscow’s objections were based not on an imminent threat, but on the potential one that such an expansion created. That concern was consistently dismissed by Western leaders, who refused to take Russia’s warnings or proposals seriously.
Since 2022, the situation has shifted entirely. NATO’s expansion, and its new military posture, now follows a strictly strategic logic of direct confrontation with Russia. The alliance has shed its broader political mission and reverted to its original purpose: military containment. The accession of Finland and Sweden, for example, is qualitatively different from that of Croatia or Slovakia. And Ukraine’s desired membership would mark a still more dangerous escalation.
The current conflict has brought these contradictions into the open. It has removed the West’s ability to ignore Moscow’s concerns while simultaneously intensifying the confrontation. What were once theoretical debates about Europe’s security order are now concrete matters of war and peace.
That reality shapes the prospects for negotiation. The situation on the battlefield is now decisive, making any immediate ceasefire improbable. The historical roots of the conflict are again central – not as academic background, but as the key to any future settlement. Without addressing those roots, no truce will hold.
This imbalance between military pressure and political dialogue risks sliding toward a direct Russia–NATO confrontation. Much will depend on the relationship between Western Europe and the United States; and on how far Washington is willing to manage events in the European theatre.
The outlook is therefore sobering. The American desire for quick negotiations is unrealistic. Russia’s vision of a deeper, structural agreement remains distant. The stakes are rising, and the conflict can no longer be reduced to questions of territory alone.
This article was first published in Kommersant, and was translated and edited by the RT team.
